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1. Sharing not owning – A new Economy and old Institutions  
 
The car we only use a fraction of its lifetime, the flat we do not inhabit while we are on 
holiday, bikes we barely ride and a toolkit we store in our basement for the rare event we are 
actually able to fix something ourselves instead of sending for a craftsmen – we own most of 
our belongings for our own purpose. The excess capacity, however, seems to be a waste of 
resources. Why do we store things rather than lending them to people who could use them?   
 
This question is not a mere theoretical one. Societies – at large – experience a rapid shift 
towards a more efficient usage of assets, skills, time and money.1 More and more people 
prioritize shared access to commodities over single ownership. 2  The Sharing Economy 
epitomizes these shifts. Uber, a platform for private chauffeurs offering rides for money and 
Airbnb, an online platform for people willing to share their flat or a part of their flat to 
tourists, are its most well known flagships. Although they are only roughly ten years old, 7 
out of 10 Europeans were already at least once active in sharing-markets.3 Uber, and Lyft 
broke records for raising venture capital, which furthermore proves the economic relevance of 
sharing-markets and the platforms operating in them.4 The Sharing Economy is here to stay.5  
 
And although the shared use of unused cars or empty flats seems to make sense and are 
overtly popular: there is resistance against these flagships of the sharing economy. In several 
European cities taxi drivers and companies have protested against the distorting competitive 
advantage non-regulated Uber drivers have. Rising rental prices in attractive tourist 
destinations has resulted in regulations impeding the sublet of housing space through 
platforms like Airbnb. But it was not until the end of 2016 that, in Europe, Uber was allowed 
to operate in some cities while being banned from others and national as well as local courts 
had to decide on the legitimacy of the respective bans. In the case of Airbnb, homeowners in 
Berlin faced stricter regulations on subletting their premises than homeowners in Dortmund or 
Munich. The question is: why do we observe such a variety in regulatory approaches? Why 
do some cities and states restrict sharing markets and some refrain from doing so? 
                                                        
1 Arun Sundararajan (2016), “The Sharing Economy”, MIT Press, Massachusetts, p.2 
2  Schor, Juliet (2016), “Debating the Sharing Economy”, in Journal of Self-Governance and Management 
Economics, Vol.4 No.3, 7-22. 
3 Murillo, David, Buckland, Heloise, Val, Esther, (2017), “When the sharing economy becomes neoliberalism on 
steroids: Unraveling the controversies”, in Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 125, 66-76, p.12 
4 Sundararajan (2016), “The Sharing Economy”, p.6 
5 Miller, Stephen R., (2016), “First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy”, in 53rd Harvard Journal on 
Legislation, No.147, pp.147-200, p. 147-149. 
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Investigating the ‘Sharing Economy’ and the way politics and societies react to it is of high 
academic relevance. The argument for the particular relevance for political science and 
International Political Economy is made in the next chapter; just one remark at this point. The 
global phenomenon of the Sharing Economy, due to its regional peer-to-peer networks, has 
predominantly local impacts. That, in turn, raises the question whether the nation state under a 
central government is still capable of introducing efficient regulation championing consumer 
protection, fair competition, and efficient market outcomes. Mayors and local regulation may 
be the way forward. The Sharing Economy therefore also fuels the debate about the declining 
role of the nation state in an economically globalized world. 
 
The decentralized peer-to-peer networks the Sharing Economy brings about are increasingly 
replacing corporations and firms at the center of economic activity and hence politico-
economic analysis. This bears (at least) two problems for the involved academic sciences. 
Firstly, existing theories explaining the existence and form of regulation need to be applied to 
this new field. Unlike the times when public and private interest theories of regulation were 
originally developed, there is no clear distinction between suppliers and consumers anymore. 
Consequently, the interest groups legislators and regulators face are likely to be different and 
the Sharing Economy, whose premise is to eradicate market failures such as the underuse of 
assets, appears to produce undesired results itself.  
 
Based on the academic relevance, the aim and contribution of this thesis is to test if the 
existing theories on the economics of regulation still have predictive power or whether or not 
they need to be amended. Following this goal, the research question for my thesis reads as 
follows: What are the driving factors behind regulation in the Sharing Economy?  
 
Research on the regulation of the Sharing Economy is not just a topic to keep academics in 
ivory towers busy. The transition from purchasing to sharing economy implicates new 
understandings of labor, employment and consumer protection. The replacement of 
individuals over corporations as suppliers will necessarily alter the way that states tax and 
organize or finance their social welfare systems. Legislation and regulations will have to be 
drafted anew, if not written in the first place. These regulations will redefine what societies 
regard as supply and demand, what living space is and how it may be used, what public 
transport is, and how the cities of the future may look. Citizens as well as incumbent and 
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contending industries have an interest in the regulation and legislation that will be imposed. 
Policymakers will face one or multiple tradeoffs in regulating the Sharing Economy. 
Hypothesizing that it will be cities dealing with the local impacts of the Sharing Economy, 
there is a case to be made that the topic of this paper is (policy-) relevant for administrations 
of especially medium-sized cities that have to, with limited personal capacities, weigh 
between incumbent industry’s interests (e.g. local hotels), potentially tense rental markets, 
and their aim to attract tourists. 
 
Instead of focusing on ride-sharing platforms like Uber or Lyft, I will put commercial home-
sharing markets (and therefore Airbnb as the only platform of consequence) at the center of 
my research. This has two reasons: Firstly, testing existing theories on the economics of 
regulation requires knowledge about the existence of market failures or voiced private 
interests of the actors involved (e.g. the hotel or taxi industry). In the case of ride-sharing 
markets this information is hard to gather since a market-failure – at least for the framework 
of a master thesis - is difficult to conceptualize and, due to fragmentary data records, even 
harder to prove. Secondly, the European Court of Justice’s ruling of December 20176 stated 
that Uber qualifies as a taxi service and therefore falls under national taxi regulation. This 
makes my research with the below described design (22 German cities) futile since there 
would be no variation in the dependent variable, the existence or absence of regulation. 
 
The paper at hand is divided into 7 chapters. Following this introduction I will, due to the 
International Relations program this thesis is written for, argue why and how the Sharing 
Economy links to International Political Economy and therefore also International Relations. 
Chapter 3 will give a brief review of the literature on the economics of regulation divided into 
public and private interest theories and link them to Public Choice theory. In addition, I will, 
based on existing and evolving literature, define home-sharing markets and Sharing Economy 
and introduce the state of the literature of the latter. The chapter concludes with an outline of 
the research gaps and presents the hypotheses this paper will test. I will continue with 
justifying the case selection of 22 German cities and discussing Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis as the method used to test the hypotheses. Before presenting the results in chapter 
six, I will present the dataset as well as its sources and the binary coding threshold required 
for a crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. In chapter 7, I will interpret the results 
                                                        
6 Court of Justice of the European Union, “The service provided by Uber connecting individuals with non-
professional drivers is covered by services in the field of transport”, Press Release No 136/17, 20.12.2017. 
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focusing on especially those cities that the theoretical model created by the QCA method did 
not predict correctly and eventually accept or reject the hypotheses. The paper ends with a 
conclusion summarizing the findings and linking them to theoretical debates.  
 
 
 
2. The Sharing Economy and International Political Economy 
 
Due to the recent emergence of the Sharing Economy there is an evolving body of literature 
within, for example, the fields of business and management science and law and regulation. 
However, literature linking International Political Economics, or International Relations for 
that matter, is scant to say the least. Nevertheless, there are more than a few elements and 
impacts of the Sharing Economy that link this new phenomenon to questions and research 
agendas of International Political Economy. I will outline three of these elements below. 
 
First of all, platforms like Uber and Airbnb being global phenomena but operating on a local 
basis – possibly without wanting to – bring up the question of the effectiveness and the future 
role of the nation state in the global economy.  
In “If Mayors Ruled the World - Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities”, Benjamin 
Barber observes the trend of a world urbanizing at a very fast rate with now more than half of 
the world’s population living in cities. His idea is that city governments, being closer to its 
citizens, are better than national governments at winning the trust and support of the people 
and, following that, meeting the challenges that come with globalization.7  The fact that, for 
him, central governments often times fight domestic ideological fights and are paralyzed due 
to heavy party machineries while mayors show a much more pragmatic than ideological 
approach underlines his argument, which is very much in line with theories this research is 
based on. Public Choice theory assumes that states’ citizens’ policy preferences are more 
heterogeneous than cities’. Democratic majority decisions will therefore impose higher 
heterogeneity costs for states than for cities. And while Barber was actually referring to cities’ 
advantage to combat challenges such as climate change, terrorism, poverty and the like, he 
makes a convincing argument for who is best at dealing with the sharing economy.   
 
                                                        
7 Barber, Benjamin, (2013), “If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities”, New Haven, 
Yale University Press 
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The subject of this paper’s research is a good example. A central government of a country that 
is divided between urban as well as rural areas will most likely not be able to regulate home-
sharing markets effectively. Touristic rural areas might be in favor of Airbnb, for example, as 
an internationally known and trusted platform marketing its holiday homes to a broader 
audience. Big cities, however, might face the competition between home-sharing markets and 
the incumbent hotel industry on the one hand, and a tense housing market exacerbated by 
homeowners renting to tourists rather than actual citizens, on the other, and therefore restrict 
home-sharing markets to a large extent. Weighing these two policy preferences, a central 
government will, in choosing a policy, impose high costs for the party whose preference is not 
met.  
If it is not the corporation at the center of economic activity but rather a myriad of 
crowd-based networks, there might be a case to replace the nation state with the city as the 
center of analysis for both political science and International Political Economy. 
 
Secondly, the Sharing Economy’s on-demand type of labor, combined with increasing 
digitalization and globalization, leads to new definitions of labor and, consequently, altered 
labor standards. This crowd-based capitalism does not only bring about the shared use of a 
physical commodity of excess capacity (such as cars or apartments) but also the shared use of 
labor force (or spare time). In his book, “The Sharing Economy – The End of Employment 
and the Rise of Crowd-Based Capitalism”, Arun Sundararajan points out that although many 
Lyft or Uber drivers drive for not more than 15 hours per week 8 , service providers on 
platforms like TaskRabbit or Instacart9 oftentimes put in as many hours as what normally 
would be considered a fulltime job. The problem is that payment for these officially ‘self-
employed workers’ during this time is not granted, but rather dependent on demand. Under 
these conditions, institutions like paid vacation, maternity leave, insurances and – at a societal 
level – the welfare state, can hardly be upheld.10 There is a debate, addressed in the chapter on 
the literature on the Sharing Economy, whether regulation or the implementation of a general 
basic income can attenuate the effects of shared labor. The impact of the Sharing Economy on 
our understanding of labor, however, is uncontested.  
Trade agreements like the TTIP, CETA or the TPP evoked public and political debates 
about jobs, labor standards and the future of the social welfare state in the age of economic 
                                                        
8 He does make the point that this would be a working time normally qualifying a part time occupation. 
9 He mentions these as American examples but the list would differ from country to country. In Europe UberEats 
and Foodora might be the most apparent examples.  
10 Sundararajan (2016), “The Sharing Economy”, p. 8-15 & 159-175 
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globalization. But the Sharing Economy has a catalyzing effect on the exigency of these 
questions. Having followed the same discussions for trade agreements, International Political 
Economy’s research program can address these for the Sharing Economy’s impact again.  
 
Thirdly, sharing personal assets and utilizing them to deliver services instead of merely 
possessing them for personal purposes upsets the theorem of marginal costs defining a 
profitable business action. In peer-to-peer networks, individuals use their personal cars to 
offer chauffeur services. They do so not to refinance the car itself but rather to earn parts of 
the maintenance costs they would – since it is a private car – bear themselves alone. If the 
service the individual provides covers his marginal costs (e.g. fuel or wearout) and a fraction 
of the fix costs (value of the car and maintenance costs), the offer is cost-effective. A 
professional taxi driver (or taxi company), on the other hand, has to incorporate the complete 
fix costs as well as the marginal costs.11 This therefore not only disrupts the taxi and public 
transport markets but also the auto industry.  
Take the following example: John Zimmer, co-founder and president of Lyft, 
estimated the average usage of a personal car at about 4% of its lifetime. Within that 4%, the 
average capacity usage is about 20%, leading to a utilization of about 1% of a product that, in 
turn, accounts for about 13% of the world’s GDP.12 If the Sharing Economy, with platforms 
like Uber and Lyft, succeeds in lessening this excess capacity, the automobile industry’s GDP 
share will shrink, placing a whole industry under pressure. 
American State interventions for General Motors and the German car-scrapping bonus 
are only two recent policies within industrialized countries directed toward the deep value 
chains of the automobile industry. Economic policies aiming to prevent the loss of jobs in 
contested or pressured industries are nothing new for politicians and those in the field of 
International Political Economy. Incorporating the Sharing Economy’s impact on the very 
same sector (or to a larger extent the Sharing Economy’s impact on incumbent industries) in 
International Political Economy’s research agenda therefore seems appropriate.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
11 Munger, Michael C., (2018), “Tomorrow 3.0 – Transaction Costs and the Sharing Economy”, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, p. 1-14 
12 Sundararajan (2016), “The Sharing Economy”, p.10 
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3. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
Having outlined the academic and social relevance of research about the regulations in the 
Sharing Economy, this section will provide a brief summary of existing theories on the 
economics of regulation. Since the scope of this paper is to test theories on their predictive 
power in peer-based markets, this chapter will likewise serve as the theoretical framework of 
the following empirical study. First I will discuss the existing theories, namely public and 
private interest theories (the latter implicitly linking to public choice theory), and then, 
referring to the evolving literature of management science and economics, define the term 
Sharing Economy. The chapter concludes with an overview of the state of the literature on the 
Sharing Economy, an identification of the existing research gaps, and posits three hypotheses.  
 
3.1. The economics of regulation 
 
Before providing an overview of existing theories on regulation two terms should be clarified. 
An extensive approach would need to differentiate between politicians (or government 
bodies) issuing laws, and regulators (or regulatory agencies) implementing regulations and 
monitoring the industry’s adherence. This paper, however, is investigating the factors local 
legislators take into account while drafting a regulation and not how it is implemented or 
monitored. Furthermore, the actual regulator in this case are employees in the public sector; a 
distinction between regulator and legislator would be necessary for an public administration 
approach but would lead to far away from this paper’s research question. I will therefore use 
the words legislature, regulator and lawmaker interchangeably.  
 
The term regulation can be divided into economic and social regulation. While social 
regulation encompasses e.g. minimum wages, mandatory insurances or consumer protection, 
economic regulation refers to taxes, subsidies or market entry barriers.13 Since this paper 
focuses on cities’ approaches to regulation, the object of investigation here is 
misappropriation decrees (explained below) not regulations on e.g. consumer protection, 
which is a matter of state or federal legislation. Consequently, regulation means economic 
regulation in the form of misappropriation decrees.  
 
 
 
                                                        
13 Den Hertog, Johan, (2010), “Review of Economic Theories of Regulation”, in Discussion Paper Series, 
No.10-18, p. 2-3 
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3.1.1. Public Interest Theories of Regulation 
 
The first set of theories explaining the existence and form of regulation is based on three 
axioms: full information of the involved actors, perfect enforcement abilities of regulators, 
and benevolent regulators and/or legislators. 14  Here, interventions in markets in form of 
regulation serve the public interest. Similar to economic theory, market failures, defined as “a 
situation where scarce resources are not put at their highest values used”15, are the main 
condition justifying government intervention. However, market failures are not a sufficient 
but a necessary condition since a potential regulation also needs to lead to a pareto-superior 
outcome.16 An apparent example is pollution. Government regulation, for example, in the 
form of CO2-certificates can ameliorate external effects of an unregulated market. The general 
logic of welfare optimizing regulation can be seen in figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Optimal welfare loss control 
 
The EL-curve in Figure 1 represents the welfare/efficiency loss of a given market failure. 
Welfare costs are at their highest when there is no intervention. The higher the level of 
government intervention is, the higher are the intervention costs (represented by curve IC). 
The optimal regulation, as in the welfare-loss minimizing point which a public-interest 
legislator would introduce, lies at the global minimum of the curve adding the efficiency 
                                                        
14 ibid, p.8  
15 ibid, p.8 
16 Ogus, Anthony, (2004), “Regulation – Legal Form and Economic Theory”, Hart Publishing, Oregon, p.30 
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argued that the transaction cost of government regulation to establish fair prices and a fair rate 
of ret rn are lower than the costs of unrestricted comp tition (Goldberg, 1979). Eq ivalently, 
it could be argued that social regulation in some cases would be a more efficient institution to 
deal with the pollution of the environment or with dealing with accidents in the workplace 
than privat  negotiations between affected parties could. Regulators wo ld not be plagued by 
failures in the information market and they could more easily bundle information to determine 
the point where the marginal cost of intervention equalizes the marginal social benefits 
(Leland, 1979; Asch, 1988). These more seri us sions of the p blic interest theories do not 
assume that regulation is perfect. They do assume the presence of a market failure, that 
regulation is comparatively the more efficient institution and that for example deregulation 
tak s place when more effici nt instit ti s develop. These theories also assu e that 
politicians act in the public interest or that the political process is efficient and that 
information on the costs and benefits of regulation is widely distributed and available (Noll, 
1989a). The core of this basic framework is captured in the following diagram.  
 
 
Total intervention costs (IC)
- regulatory costs
- compliance costs
- indirect costs
Total efficiency losses (EL)
Iopt
level of intervention
Figure 1: Optimal level of welfare loss control
€
S(EL+IC)
 
 
Imagine an unre lated natural monopoly firm supplying public utility services. The firm 
makes supernormal profits, charges different prices to different consumer groups and does not 
supply services to high-cost consumers in rural areas. Economic theory predicts an inefficient 
allocation of r sources. Without regulatory i t r ti  these costs ar  at its highest at the 
point where the EL-curve intersects with the vertical axe (intersection not visible). Intervening 
in the market results in a decline of these welfare cost. The stronger the level of intervention, 
the lo er the welfare loss  in the private sector will be. The naï  public interest theory of 
regulation for example, would explain ‘fair rate of return’ regulation from the presence of the 
natural monopoly firm. Prices must decline and production increased until societal resources 
are allocated efficiently. The more complex public interest theories of regulation take the 
costs of regulatory intervention into account. The more a regulator intervenes in the private 
opera i  of the firm, the higher the interventi  costs will be (curve IC). The regulator must 
have information on cost and demand facing the firm before efficient prices can be 
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losses and intervention costs.17 
 
Four different kinds of market failures can be identified: Imperfect competition, unstable 
markets, missing markets, and undesirable market results (or externalities). 18  There is 
extensive literature on government interventions for these respective market failures. For the 
limited scope of this paper, however, I will focus on externalities as well as missing markets 
as they have direct implications for the Sharing Economy in general and the research of this 
paper in particular. Missing markets prevail whenever information problems exist or 
transaction costs are too high and, thus, impede the creation of a market.19 There might be a 
market to rent the bikes mentioned in the introduction – but because we do not know if the 
person borrowing them will actually return them and it is too costly to get a certificate of 
good conduct, we do not rent our bikes. The market does not come into existence. Remedy for 
this kind of market failures are – for example – agencies issuing product labels. The Sharing 
Economy, as we will see in the next subchapter, is also a remedy for missing markets. 
Undesired market results or externalities occur when the benefits or costs of an economic 
interaction affect a party that did not partake in the respective interaction.20 The causer of the 
externality does not internalize the costs into his decision-making. The above-mentioned 
example of pollution and CO2 certificates serves as an example for externalities and possible 
intervention. A tense rental market because of an unregulated home-sharing market is another 
example.  
 
Correcting undesirable market results, for some adherents of public interest theories21, is a 
justification for correcting markets for non-economic reasons in order to serve the public 
interest.22  
 
A list of public interests justifying government intervention cannot exist “since what 
constitutes the 'public interest' [varies] according to time, place, and the specific values held 
by a particular society” 23 . Anthony Ogus lists distributional issues, paternalism and 
                                                        
17 Den Hertog (2010), “Review of Economic Theories of Regulation”, p.12 
18 Ogus (2004), “Regulation – Legal Form and Economic Theory”, p.33 
19 Den Hertog (2010), “Review of Economic Theories of Regulation”, p.16 
20 Burda, Michael C.; Wyplosz, Carles, (2009), “Makroökonomie, Eine Europäische Perspektive”, Vahlen, 
München, p. 561 
21 Arguably those with a broader definition of public interest 
22  Posner, Richard A., (1974), “Theories of Economic Regulation”, The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 335 – 358, p. 336-338 
23 Ogus (2004), “Regulation – Legal Form and Economic Theory”, p.29 
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community values as examples of public interests24; minimum wages, universal healthcare 
and (subsidized) unemployment insurance are corresponding examples.25 
 
Public interest theories are generally criticized in three ways. The fact that market failures are 
considered to be a necessary condition is criticized since “a good economist needs no more 
than fifteen minutes' notice to produce a market failure to "explain" any of these 
intervention“26. In addition to that many scholars refer to many mechanisms which markets 
can produce themselves to remedy market failures, such as adverse selection (e.g. product 
guaranty). A second point of critique is that although the theory assumes that regulation (re-) 
establishes efficiency it also justifies redistributive measures for non-economic goals. The at 
times vague definitions of public interest and efficiency make empirical testing impossible.27 
Thirdly, even if one allows public interest to also refer to public preferences or ‘community 
values’, the theory does not explain how these preferences are transferred into the actual 
political process and decision-making.28 
 
 
3.1.2. Private Interest Theories 
 
The theoretical insufficiency of public interest theories as well as the increasing empirical 
refutation 29  led to the development of a whole new set of theories incorporating (and 
differentiating between) the consumers’ and producers’ interest in the explanation of 
regulation.  
 
The first of these theories, the capture theory, was developed by political scientists to account 
for the insufficiencies of public interest theory. Here agencies, established by legislators to 
regulate an industry, go through a life cycle and end up favoring the industry they were set out 
to regulate, because the industry - or the market the industry operates in - is on the political 
agenda. Therefore legislators create an agency to regulate the market. Over time the public 
                                                        
24 ibid, p.46 
25 For an elaborate discussion of non-economic goals see Ogus (2004), “Regulation – Legal Form and Economic 
Theory”, p.46-54 and Zerbe, Richard O., (2000), “The End of Market Failures”, in Regulation, Vol. 23 No. 2, 
pp. 10-14. 
26 Peltzman, Sam; Levine, Michael E.; Noll, Roger G., (1989), “The Economic Theory of Regulation after a 
Decade of Deregulation”, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, Vol. 1989, pp. 1-59, 
p.17 
27 Posner (1974), “Theories of Economic Regulation”, p. 337 – 338. and Den Hertog (2010), “Review of 
Economic Theories of Regulation”, p.22 
28 Posner (1974), “Theories of Economic Regulation”, p.338-240 and Stigler, George J., (1971), “The Theory of 
Economic Regulation”, in The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 2 No.1, 3-21 
29 See for example: Stigler (1971), “The Theory of Economic Regulation”, p.4 
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and hence the political focus shift away and the agency is neither monitored nor adequately 
funded anymore. The agency then tends to avoid conflict and increasingly cooperates with the 
industry, partly because it is dependent on industry information (information asymmetry) to 
operate. Over time this leads to the agency representing or championing the industry or 
regulated companies.30 
 
Although this early theory explained a couple of cases where regulation or regulatory 
agencies were not efficient or did not promote the public interest, it is nevertheless criticized. 
First of all, it was rebutted by a number of cases where agencies were – despite less public 
attention – not captured.31 In addition to that, some criticized its lack of predictive power 
since it does not answer the questions why for example customers do not capture agencies or 
why agencies concede in the first place.32 
 
Noticing the deficiencies of capture theory, George Stigler, in his seminal text “The theory of 
economic regulation”, advanced it to what is now commonly called the Chicago Theory of 
Economic Regulation. Rather than referring to capture he explains the existence of regulation 
by a supply and demand model33 and holds that “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the 
industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefits.”34 Unlike legislators of public 
interest theories, Stigler’s legislators do not posses perfect information and primarily seek re-
election, and are therefore utility maximizing actors. Interest groups, demanding regulation, 
can ensure a politician’s re-election through campaign finance or providing votes in return for 
favorable legislation.  
 
Forming and voicing an opinion on political or regulatory matters is, compared to the 
marginal political influence gained, very cost and time intensive for an individual person. By 
bundling these costs and sharing the benefits with their members, interest-groups are more 
efficient in exerting influence in the political decision-making process, which is why 
individuals as well as corporations form interest groups.35 Figure 2 shows why the industry 
                                                        
30 Den Hertog (2010), “Review of Economic Theories of Regulation”, p.22 or Ogus (2004), “Regulation – Legal 
Form and Economic Theory”, p.57-58 
31 Den Hertog (2010), “Review of Economic Theories of Regulation”, p.22 
32 Posner (1974), “Theories of Economic Regulation”, p. 341-342 or Ogus (2004), “Regulation – Legal Form 
and Economic Theory”, 
33 With governments as the supplier and the public and industry as the demander for (non) regulation.  
34 Stigler (1971), “The Theory of Economic Regulation”, p. 3 
35 Den Hertog (2010), “Review of Economic Theories of Regulation”, p.23 and Stigler (1971), “The Theory of 
Economic Regulation”, p. 5-6 
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has an advantage in forming lobby groups and exerting influence compared to consumer 
groups.  
 
 
Figure 2: Interest groups and regulatory activity36 
Interest group ‘A’ (industry) is characterized by lower organization costs, meaning that it is 
easier for ‘A’, a small interest group, to mobilize its members since they typically show 
higher levels of homogeneity. The bigger group ‘B’ (consumers), on the other hand, shows 
both higher organization costs (more heterogeneous interests) and lower benefits. The 
comparatively high costs result from the group size and the resulting ‘free-rider’-problem. 
The fact that benefits from the interest groups’ actions are divided among fewer members is 
another reason why industry interest groups are better at mobilizing their members and, thus, 
influence a given political outcome. From Figure 2 it follows that the costs of a given 
regulation will be spread over many consumers. The resulting minimal product price increase 
is likely to not result in the formation of consumer interest groups which, in turn, is another 
incentive for legislators to regulate in favor of the industry involved.37 
 
It is easy to see that regulation, for adherents of private interest theories, is not explicable by a 
market failure but by a wealth transfer from interest groups to legislators and regulators. The 
existence of an interest group is therefore the necessary condition for regulation, not the 
                                                        
36 Taken from Den Hertog (2010), “Review of Economic Theories of Regulation”, p.23 
37 Stigler (1971), “The Theory of Economic Regulation”, and Den Hertog (2010), “Review of Economic 
Theories of Regulation”, p.23-24 
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from antitrust legislation, grant subsidies or ban the entry of competitors directly so that the 
level of prices rise. The government can maintain minimum prices and restrict entry more 
easily than a cartel. The government can suppress the use of substitutes and support 
complements. An example of each is the suppression of transport by trucking to protect the 
railroads and the subsidization of airports for the benefit of airlines. On the one hand, 
therefore a demand will arise for government regulation. The political decision-making 
process on the other hand makes it possible for industries to exploit politics for its own ends. 
For this proposition, Stigler uses the insights of Downs (1957) and Olson (1965). In the 
political process, primarily interest groups will exercise political influence, as opposed to 
individuals. Individuals will not participate because forming an opinion about political 
questions is expensive in terms of time, energy and money, while the benefits in terms of 
political influence will be negligible. Individuals will only be informed on particular interests 
as member of an interest group. Democracies will thus mostly be a platform for interest 
groups. Some groups can organize themselves less expensively than others. Small groups 
have the advantage because the transaction costs are lower and the ‘free-rider’ problem is 
smaller than is the case with large groups. Furthermore, in small groups the preferences will 
be more homogeneous than in large groups. Small groups also have the advantage in that for 
the same expected total revenue, the revenue per member of the group is greater. The fact that 
apparently large groups can still be well organized is explained by Stigler through 
concentration and asymmetry (Stigler, 1974). The large companies in a concentrated branch 
will see themselves as a small group. In the case of asymmetry in the industry , for example as 
a result of product diversity or widely varying productio  techniques, separate companies will 
wish to prevent unfavorable regulation and will participate in the organization. Stigler’s 
theory is illustrated in the figure below (adapted from Baron, 2000). 
 
 
Interest group A
Benefits
Costs
Benefits
Costs
Action Action
Interest group B
Regulatory
Agency
marginal benefit
marginal cost
marginal benefit
marginal cost
actionaction
Figure 5: Interest group representation depends on costs and benefits
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market failure. There are, however, some nuanced theories that explain why in some cases 
regulation is, contrary to what Stiglitz’ theory would predict, consumer friendly. Although 
there is an extensive body of theoretical literature, I will for the sake of brevity focus on the 
reformulations that are most important for this study.  
 
In an essay published at the same time as Josef Stiglitz, Richard Posner found that economic 
regulations benefitting the consumers at the expense of the industry involved do exist. He 
observed regulations imposing standard fees for public transportation or standard prices for 
gas water and telephones for both rural and urban populations.38 Especially the latter is not 
explicable with Stigler’s approach since the supply-costs for the industry are higher in rural 
areas than in cities. Following Posner’s observations, Sam Peltzman reformulated the original 
theory in a way that regards law-makers as political support maximizing actors. Politicians 
will introduce regulation that secures them the most votes from consumers without risking the 
loss of significant campaign finance from the industry.39 The result is often times far from an 
efficient solution (public interest theory) but it also differs from the original theory where 
regulators necessarily maximize the profits for the industry.  
 
Incorporating consumers and the industry as voters and regulators as political support 
maximizing individuals has the further advantage that it explains or predicts the form of a 
regulation as well as the industries being regulated. This advanced Chicago theory states that 
in competitive branches such as taxi companies, freight or agriculture regulation will likely 
favor the producers. Since the competition in the market will arrange for low prices (and thus 
ensure votes from the consumers), economic regulation in the form of e.g. market entry 
barriers can secure for the lawmaker the industry’s favor. From this logic it follows that in 
less competitive or monopolistic markets (transportation or communication providers), 
regulation will be consumer friendly (e.g. price caps).40 
 
Private interest theories are criticized for their assumptions, the difficulties in empirically 
verifying its assumptions, and certain incompleteness, especially regarding the role of the law 
–maker. The assumption that the definition of who benefits and who is bearing the cost of a 
regulation is a necessary condition for regulation does not prove that these costs and benefits 
                                                        
38 Posner, Richard A., (1971), “Taxation by Regulation”, in The Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science, Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 22-50. 
39 Peltzman, (1976), “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation” 
40  Posner (1974), “Theories of Economic Regulation”, p. 353-356 and Peltzman (1976), “Toward a More 
General Theory of Regulation” 
 xviii 
actually drive the regulation itself.41 In addition, testing these theories turns out to be difficult, 
to say the least, since it is almost impossible to test which interest groups are more influential 
(not just vocal) in the decision making progress.42 Lastly, the theories hold that interest groups 
determine the outcome of (re-)elections of regulators and, hence, impact the form of 
regulation. However, the motivations of lawmakers, the interaction of interest groups and 
regulators, and the mechanisms of the decision making process are not theorized.43  
 
Public Choice theory gives insights into these motivations, interactions and mechanisms. 
Since the aim of this study, however, is to test public and private interest theories and due to 
the limited framework of this paper, this branch of theories are not included.  
 
3.2. The Sharing Economy 
 
The subject of this paper, the Sharing Economy, is a recent development and is in fact still 
progressing into different forms at a fast pace. A clear definition and delimitations to other 
related phenomenas is yet to be found. Yet, first studies about the impacts of sharing markets 
are being published. In the following section I will refer to two recent publications on the 
Sharing Economy as a whole in defining the home-sharing markets that are the subject of this 
paper. Closing this chapter I will present a brief state of the research on the Sharing Economy 
regarding regulatory issues, its development, and the impacts and opportunities that come 
with this new way of economic interaction.  
 
The first - and maybe most important - delineation must be made between sharing and gifting 
markets. In a gift economy a network of people exchanges goods or services without the 
expectation of reciprocity and without a commercial element. Lacking any numerical value or 
economic intention in gifting economies, “the true purpose of any exchange or transfer of 
objects is increasing social cohesion.” 44  A fitting example for both gifting and sharing 
markets are couchsurfing and Airbnb. Only the latter shows a clear economic element (the 
exchange of money) while couchsurfing emphasizes the social aspect of the interaction.  
 
                                                        
41 Den Hertog (2010), “Review of Economic Theories of Regulation”, p.29 
42 Potters, Jan; Sloof, Randolph (1996), “Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their 
influence”, European Journal of Political Economy, 403-442. 
43 Ibid, and Den Hertog (2010), “Review of Economic Theories of Regulation”, p.30 
44 Sundararajan (2016), “The Sharing Economy”, p.36 
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Nevertheless, Sharing Economy platforms like Airbnb combined elements of gifting markets 
and networks with standard market elements. 45  It is partly because of this that some 
definitions of the Sharing Economy focus more on the sharing and others more on the 
market/capitalistic aspects. In the absence of a commonly agreed upon definition of the 
sharing economy, my paper uses Sundararajan’s five characteristics for what he 
interchangeably terms sharing economy and crowd-based capitalism: 1) market-based, 2) 
high impact capital, 3) the replacement of centralized hierarchies with crowd-based networks 
and 4-5) blurring the line between employment and casual labor as well as the personal and 
the professional.46 As mentioned above I will limit this research on commercial home sharing 
markets. The only platform of consequence in the cities I am investigating is Airbnb.  
 
The fact that the Sharing Economy operates in local networks that are being set up by 
platforms such as Airbnb and Uber is the starting point of Sundararajan’s analysis of the 
social and economic impacts. For him, the development this crowd-based capitalism institutes 
will lead to more self-employment and local networks providing services and goods resulting 
in economic structures that resemble those of the times prior to industrialization (no 
corporation in the center of economic activity).47 He therefore holds that aligning modern 
institutions like insurance, labor laws, guaranteed vacation and a welfare state to these 
inevitable developments is the most urgent question for policy makers. On the other hand, he 
regards the self-regulation of sharing markets through ratings (like Uber’s 5-star rating) as a 
suitable instrument to warrant consumer protection.  
 
In his recently published book “Tomorrow 3.0 – Transaction Costs and the Sharing 
Economy”, Carlos Munger measures the importance of the Sharing Economy by its ability to 
reduce or do away with transaction costs. Digitalization and the spread of smart phones make 
it possible for platforms to offer triangulation (“information about identity and location, and 
agreeing on terms, including price”48), transfer (“a way of transferring payment and good that 
is immediate and as invisible as possible”49) and trust (“a way of outsourcing assurance of 
honesty and performance of the terms of the contract”50). The Sharing Economy is therefore 
the ultimate remedy to missing markets and, according to him, more sharing-markets are 
                                                        
45 ibid, p.39 
46 ibid, p.27 
47 ibid , p.3-7 
48 Munger (2018), “Tomorrow 3.0 – Transaction Costs and the Sharing Economy”, p.6 
49 ibid, p.6 
50 ibid, p.6 
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expected to develop. Since the increased access to excess capacity will inevitably lead to a 
decreased demand of new goods, less production will be required which, in turn leads to less 
demand of work force. Taking this development into account he proposes the introduction of 
a basic income to make up for the loss of income through work in production.  
 
In addition to these two books, several studies about the Sharing Economy and its impact 
exist. I will briefly introduce a few of these, sorted by their broad thematic context.  
 
Regulatory cooperation 
Next to the question of consumer protection and trust-based self-regulation 51  there is a 
juridical discussion revolving around the type and level of regulation. Reviewing regulatory 
practices of U.S. cities, Koopman et al. argue that for new innovations like the sharing 
economy, policymakers should “level the playing field” by "deregulating down" to put 
everyone on equal footing, not by "regulating up" to “achieve parity”.52 Rauch and Schleicher 
argue that the remedy for the regulatory conflict between incumbent industries and sharing 
firms is local government regulation. Given the growing urban importance of sharing 
economy markets, they suggest that governments as well as firms should reconsider their 
approach to regulation. They call for data-based research on regulatory structures that include 
normative-societal aspects as well.53  With regards to tax law applicability to the sharing 
economy, Leaphart points to the necessity for national governments to define whether 
individuals offering services through sharing platforms are employees or contractors. Local 
governments, on the other hand, will be forced to collaborate with e.g. housing-sharing 
platforms to collect occupancy taxes.54 
 
Development 
There is evolving literature on the sharing economy’s economic impact. Several authors come 
to the conclusion that despite the allegedly low entry costs, sharing platforms financed by 
“winner takes all” venture capital will transform into monopolistic or oligopolistic markets55. 
                                                        
51 See Sundararajan (2016), “The Sharing Economy”, and Schorr (2015), “Debating the Sharing Economy” 
52 Koopman, Christopher, Mitchell, Matthew, Thierer, Adam, (2015), “The Sharing Economy and Consumer 
Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change“, in Bussines, Entrepreneurship and Law, Vol.8 No.2, 529-
546. 
53 Rauch, Daniel E., Schleicher, David, (2015) “Like Uber, but for Local Government Law: The Future of Local 
Regulation of the Sharing Economy“ in Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 76. No.4, 901-964. 
54 Leaphart, Jennifer M., (2016), “Sharing Solutions: An Analysis of Taxing the Sharing Economy in the United 
States and Europe“, in Tulane Law Review, Vol. 91 No.189, 189-215. 
55 Murillo, Buckland, Val (2017), “When the sharing economy becomes neoliberalism on steroids: Unraveling 
the controversies”, p. 68-69 
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Another branch of literature discusses the forms of sharing markets and the efforts of 
traditional companies to adapt to the SE’s disruptive character (e.g. BMW’s drive now in 
European cities). 
 
Impact and ‘Chances’ 
Additionally, recent studies have for the first time examined the impact of home-sharing 
markets on rent prices. In the case of Boston, Horn and Merante find that a one standard 
deviation increase in Airbnb listings leads to an average rental price increase of 0.4%.56 
Although the increase is higher in central parts of Boston, one can say that the effect of 
Airbnb, in this case, is rather marginal. A similar study for German cities, however, is 
missing. AirbnbVsBerlin, a project on visualization of data journalism of students of the 
University of Potsdam, however, uses webscraping methods to visualize the number of 
listings in quarters of Berlin and other German cities.57 The actual idea for this thesis derives 
from a study of Jake Wegmann and Junfeng Jiao trying to outline guiding principles for local 
regulation of home-sharing markets. The authors doubt that local governments have adequate 
information on the sharing economy’s impact and – for the case of home-sharing - especially 
emphasize the difference between commercial and “mom-and-pop” hosts for successful 
regulation.58 Regarding urban mobility markets, a study by Cohen and Kietzmann suggests 
several models how Sharing Economy firms like Uber or Lyft can reduce city traffic and 
pollution problems. By using an adapted agency model, with service providers as agents and 
local governments as principals, they try to find the theoretically best relationship between the 
two but call for further research on how to practically align the incentives of key 
stakeholders.59 The benefits of cooperation like these are also underlined by Andreas Knie 
who points out that the incumbent approaches (e.g. drive now) to their sharing contestants are 
prone to failure simply because of a lack of parking space. According to Knie, a radical shift 
in legislation such as legalizing ride-sharing platforms like Uber leads to a reduction of inner-
city traffic.60 
                                                        
56 Horn, Keren, Merante, Mark, (2017), “Is home sharing driving up rents? Evidence from Airbnb in Boston”, in 
Journal of Housing Economics, Vol. 38., 14-24. 
57 Airbnb vs. Berlin can be found under: http://www.airbnbvsberlin.de/#introduction  
58 Wegmann, Jake, Jiao, Junfeng, (2017), “Taming Airbnb: Toward guiding principles for local regulation of 
urban vacation rentals based on empirical results from five US cities“, in Land Use Policy, Vol. 69, 494-501 
59 Cohen, Boyd, Kietzmann, Jan, (2014), “Ride On! Mobility Business Models for the Sharing Economy”, in 
Organization &Environment, Vol. 27 No. 3, 279-296. 
60 Brandeins – das Wirtschaftsmagazin, Jhg. 20, No.1, 01.2018, pp. 96-101 
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3.3 The research gap 
 
The evolving literature on the Sharing Economy proves that there is a plethora of research 
gaps and questions that need to be filled and answered. Economists might be interested in the 
effectiveness and results of existing regulations since, economically speaking, a government 
intervention is hardly justified given that the Sharing Economy itself is technically a remedy 
to missing markets itself. Scholars of law or public administration could take the opportunity 
of sharing-networks replacing corporation at the center of economic activity to investigate 
how peer-to-peer networks can effectively be regulated and how regulation can be monitored. 
Especially social regulations like consumer protection or labor laws, as Sundararajan points 
out, are interesting starting points. 
 
The Sharing Economy’s impacts are similar to those familiar to the fields of political science 
and international political economy already touches. Yet, how states or cities can handle these 
new and upcoming impacts for now relies on theories of regulation that were founded at a 
time when the Internet did not even exist. In addition, the line between producer and 
consumer – crucial for public and private interest theories – is blurry with the Sharing 
Economy to say the least. The first step to assess how states can handle the challenges 
described in part two must therefore be to test whether the existing theories still work in this 
new setting or if they need to be reformulated.  
 
This is the research gap this paper tries to fill. In order to answer the research question and 
check whether the traditional theories on regulation still have explanatory power, I will test 
the following hypotheses: 
 
H1:  Public interest theories explain the driving forces of regulation in home-sharing 
markets. 
 
H2: Private interest theories explain the driving forces of regulation in home-sharing 
markets. 
 
H3: Both interest theories together, rather than on their own, explain regulation in home 
sharing markets. 
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If Hypothesis 3 proves to be correct, more research on the interaction of legislators and 
interest groups needs to be done. 
 
 
 
4. Research Design 
 
Following the above-identified research gap, this chapter will introduce the research design 
used to answer the research question. First of all I will present and justify my case selection, 
namely the 16 capitals of the German Bundesländer and the six remaining cities with a 
population of more than 500.000. I will then operationalize the concepts regulation, market-
failure and interest and introduce Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as the method of 
analysis. After reformulating the hypotheses in a QCA-compatible fashion, I will present my 
data set as well as its calibration and provide descriptive statistics.  
 
4.1. Case Selection 
 
Examining regulatory approaches of cities on home-sharing markets is, admittedly, a new 
topic for international relations in general, and international political economy in particular. 
Although the link to international political is reasonable, even if not visible at first sight, the 
thesis at hand will focus on the regulatory approaches of 22 German cities. The reason for this 
focus is twofold:  
 
First of all, focusing on cities of one particular country automatically controls for several 
factors that could possibly influence the outcome. Having public interest theories in mind, one 
could think of varying stances towards welfare states (e.g. in the comparison of U.S., British 
and German cities) resulting in different societal values and different incentives for legislators 
to intervene. The degree of federalism of a country has an impact on what the responsible 
legislative body is (city, state, central government) or how much room for maneuver cities 
have in drafting regulations. By focusing on cities of one country, this thesis takes varying 
degrees of federalism into account and controls for them. Therefore, the resulting case 
selection resembles a most similar systems design enabling this thesis to test the explanatory 
power of public and private interest theories. Admittedly, the case selection limits the paper’s 
external validity but, as a tradeoff, shows a high degree of internal validity. I will address the 
validity tradeoff for future research in the limitations section at the end of this paper.  
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Secondly, research on the regulatory approaches of cities of different countries would – due to 
the limited time available to complete this Master Thesis – not have been feasible. Analyzing 
legal provisions and regulations requires high levels of language proficiency. Without 
substantial external help, the author could have therefore only analyzed the regulations of 
German or English speaking cities, potentially contradicting the most similar case approach. 
Secondly, the data gathering, especially for the interest-theory based conditions as well as the 
operationalization of the concepts, given the differing legal settings of e.g. trade and labor 
unions, would be more difficult to say the least. Limited time and knowledge of legal settings 
could also lead to overlooking important intervening variables or conditions, and hence render 
the research results less meaningful.  
 
As mentioned above, the dataset will contain the 16 capitals of the German Bundesländer. 
Including the Bundesländer in the data set provides some sort of geographical balance (East 
and West Germany) and makes the cases comparative.61 The 15 capitals alone would leave 
out cities like Frankfurt am Main or Cologne that are important student and trade fair cities 
and therefore likely to be lucrative for home sharing markets. To avoid this selection bias I 
added the six remaining cities with a population of more than 500.000. Consequently, the 
dataset consists of the cities Munich, Stuttgart, Saarbruecken, Mainz Wiesbaden, Erfurt, 
Dresden, Duesseldorf, Hannover, Magdeburg, Potsdam, Schwerin, Kiel, Hamburg, Berlin, 
Bremen, Frankfurt a.M. Dortmund, Essen, Leipzig, Nuremberg and Cologne. Figure 1 depicts 
the cities, their respective population and their geographical position.  
 
                                                        
61 E.g. all of them host substantive government bodies or are home of the state’s most important trade fair  
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Figure 3: The 22 cities of the dataset 
 
The period under review is comprised of the years between 2009 and 2016. Although it was 
founded in 2008, a ‘Google trends’ search suggests that Airbnb only started to gain popularity 
in Germany around the beginning of 2011 (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 4: Google trend on "Airbnb Deutschland"62 
 
                                                        
62 Searches for e.g. “Airbnb München” (or other major German cities) deliver comparable results.  
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The years 2009 until 2011 are included to give a more complex, post economic-crisis 
development of both the rental and the hotel market. 
 
4.2. Operationalization 
 
Theory on the economics of regulation suggests that the presence of either market-failures or 
private interests explains the presence or absence of regulation. To empirically test the 
predictive power of private and public interest theories, these theory-based concepts need to 
be operationalized into quantifiable variables. In the following, I will summarize the 
operationalization of the terms regulation, market failure, and private interests, and how they 
are reflected in the data set.  
 
Regulation 
Whether or not a city has a regulation on home-sharing in place is the dependent variable of 
this data set. The research question aims at the mechanism triggering regulation, not the 
extent or rigidity of the regulation itself. By and large, German cities have one way to directly 
regulate home-sharing markets: by regulating the misappropriation63 of housing space. The 
respective federal state needs to enact a law in order to transfer the regulation of 
misappropriation to the local legislators. With the reference to a tense housing market, cities 
are then able to issue a decree (Zweckentfremdungsverordnung/verbot) making the conversion 
of housing space into, for example holiday flats, a punishable offence. These decrees are 
usually effective for five years and may be extended if their positive impact can be proven. 
The decree then also specifies to which degree housing space may be subleased. Of course 
there are also regulations at the federal or European level. However, they are rather aimed at 
consumer protection or taxation and do not per se allow or ban home sharing markets.  
 
Therefore, the operationalization of regulation of a home-sharing market for this paper is the 
existence/absence of a misappropriation decree. Depending on the exact research question, 
other operationalizations of the concept might make sense. Limiting regulation to a binary 
variable can affect the significance of this paper’s finding. I will address the existing 
limitations and possible remedies in chapter 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
63 In German “Zweckentfremdung” – I will stick to the English translation for the sake of simplicity.  
 xxvii 
Market-Failure 
 
Economic theory defines market-failure as the inefficient allocation of scarce resources. 
Following the literature of both public interest theories and neoclassical economics mentioned 
above, four types of market failure exist: unstable markets, imperfect competition, missing 
markets, and undesirable market results.64 
 
Home sharing markets operate between the housing and the hotel markets, both of which are 
non-monopolistic markets. Nevertheless, there might be oligopolistic hotel market structures 
with price agreements or a lack of competition leading to high degree of capacity utilization 
and prices deviating from marginal costs. In lieu of testing the market power of actors in the 
hotel market of a given city, by e.g. the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index or the development of 
prices per room and night, this paper will use the degree of hotel capacity utilization to test 
whether or not a market failure in the hotel market exists. A high degree of utilization might 
suggest an insufficient supply and incentivize a regulator to not regulate the home-sharing 
market in order to provide for more accommodation, increased competition, and lower prices. 
It has to be clear that this variable is a proxy variable and, due to the lack of data, only a 
second or third best proxy. 
 
Unstable markets, often times the result of long-term over capacity and characterized by 
excessive price competition, could theoretically exist in both of the affected markets. A look 
at the raw data (presented later in this chapter), however, shows that this is not the case. The 
average rental price as well as the costs and profit per hotel-night show a positive trend.65 And 
although the sharing economy reduces transaction costs and therefore creates a myriad of new 
markets66, the hotel and housing markets exist but the interaction of the two markets – caused 
by e.g. Airbnb – can lead to undesirable market results.  
 
This paper assumes that home sharing markets can have undesirable impacts on the housing 
market. If a home sharing market offers homeowners higher profits than the housing market, 
homeowners are incentivized to rent out housing space on the former rather than the latter. By 
limiting the supply of housing space, resulting in higher rental prices, the home sharing 
market can produce external effects on the lettings market. This external effect on the lettings 
                                                        
64 Den Hertog (2010), “Review of Economic Theories of Regulation”, p. 8 
65 Colliers International, “Marktbericht Berlin Hotel”, 2017  
66 Munger (2018), “Tomorrow 3.0 – Transaction Costs and the Sharing Economy”, 
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market is operationalized by including the development of the rental price per square meter of 
the respective cities within the above mentioned time period.  
 
 
 
Private Interests 
 
For private interest as well as public choice theory, it is not the market failure but rather the 
existence of a private interest that explains the existence as well as the strength and rigidity of 
a regulation. Due to the limited framework of this Master thesis, the private interests are 
operationalized by the existence (or absence) of a public statement of the two most important 
interest groups, the Deutscher Hotel- und Gaststättenverband67 (DeHoGa) and the Deutscher 
Mieterbund68 (DMB hereafter referred to tenant’s association).  
 
The DeHoGa, due to the fact that it is the umbrella association of both the hotel as well as the 
gastronomy industry, might be regarded as – from the theoretical viewpoint – a rather 
heterogeneous interest group. However, Airbnb mainly competes with midrange hotels that 
are – in the German case – oftentimes mediums sized enterprises. These enterprises face the 
lowest organization costs at the DeHoGa, which, in turn, explains the fact that the DeHoGa is 
the only relevant interest group for the hotel sector. In addition to that, it is present in all 16 
federal states and operates in accordance with the German section of the International Hotel 
Association (IHA).69  
 
The DMB is the national association of tenants associations organized at both local and 
federal level. Funded solely by the membership fees of its 3 million members, it represents 
the interests of tenants in Germany.70 Although local tenants clubs that are not part of the 
DMB exist, this study – without too much foreclosure – did not find any deviation between a 
single club and the DMB-organized counterpart.  
 
There are undoubtedly many more interest groups that could influence the existence and 
extent of regulations. Delimiting private interests to only the two biggest interest groups 
might oversimplify the process of political decision-making. I will address this and other 
                                                        
67 Translates to: German Hotel and Gastronomy Association 
68 Translates to: German tenant’s association 
69 Deutscher Hotellerie- und Gaststättenverband (DeHoGa), https://www.dehoga-bundesverband.de 
70 Deutscher Mieterbund (DMB), https://www.mieterbund.de/dmb/deutscher-mieterbund.html 
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limitations in chapter 7. The subsequent chapter will introduce the sources of the raw-data set 
and offer relevant descriptive statistics. 
 
 
 
4.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The dependent variable ‘REGULATION’ depicts whether or not a city introduced a 
misappropriation decree after the appearance of home-sharing markets. None of the cities had 
a decree in effect in 2009 and no decree was issued before 2012, the year when Airbnb 
entered the German market. A city without an active misappropriation decree will not be part 
of the set ‘REGULATION’ while a city that put a decree into effect will be part of the set, 
represented by a ‘1’ in the truth table. Figure 3 
 
Figure 5: Regulation 
 
The condition ‘RENTAL_PRICE_DEVELOPMENT’ is based on data provided by the 
empirica–institute. Found in 1990, empirica is an independent research and consulting 
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institute for social-scientific and economic matters.71 For its quarterly updated housing market 
data bank, empirica calculates the average m2 price for all the online advertised apartments of 
a city.  
 
I processed empirica’s data by computing the average m2 price of the four quarters of 2009 
and 2016 and the resulting percentage of price increase. On average the rent per m2 rose by 
24,15% with a standard deviation of 9,41%. The range between Essen (~11%) and Berlin 
(~55%) is comparatively wide. While interpreting this data one should take into account that 
the inflation rate over the time period was 9%. Interpreting the raw data, we see that only the 
prices of Essen and Schwerin’s housing markets can be considered stable and that all other 
cities of the data set are dealing with a more or less tense housing market.  
 
 
Figure 6: Rental price development across the cities 
 
The other condition testing a public interest argument behind regulation is 
‘HOTEL_CAPACITY’. Gathering the raw data for this variable was comparatively tedious. 
Neither the DeHoGa nor the IHA on either the federal or the state level have data on the 
                                                        
71 Empirica – Forschung und Beratung, https://www.empirica-institut.de  
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capacity usage of their members, and instead referred me to the statistic agencies of the 
federal states. Their data banks, in turn, do not all include a variable depicting the hotel 
capacity. Nevertheless, they all provided the data on guest nights per city and year as well as 
hotel beds per city and year. The data set at hand is based on the definition of a hotel 
(therefore counting into the guest nights per city) as a accommodation facility with more than 
12 beds (excluding camping sites) and calculates the hotel capacity using the following 
formula: 
 
Hotel capacity = Guest nights per city and year / Hotel beds per city and year 
 
Figure 5 shows the capacity usage of the selected cities in 2016. Over the period of 
observation, all cities show a positive trend72 Average capacity usage in 2016 was 45,38% 
with a range of 20,1%. 
 
 
Figure 7: Hotel Capacity Usage in 2016 
                                                        
72 Raw data on the development of the hotel market can be found in the annex. Schwerin (population 95.000) in 
2009 can be considered an outlier given the fact that it hosted the Bundesgartenschau (Federal Garden Show 
with about 1.9 million visitors. 
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The two conditions indicating the private interest holders’ stance are 
‘TENANT_ASSOCIATION’ and ‘DEHOGA’. The first idea was to either gather information 
from the municipalities or local politicians directly (whether or not either the DeHoGa or a 
body of the DMB voiced an opinion on home sharing markets and demanded regulation of 
some sort) or to check whether – for the cities issuing regulations – there was an (official) 
hearing in which interests from the private economy or tenants associations were voiced. 
Unfortunately, the responses I got from the first approach were contradicting (or produced too 
many missing values) and hearings did not take place or their minutes are still undisclosed.  
 
The dataset at hand is the result of three73 Google searches as well as key word searches on 
the homepages of both the local DMB associations as well as the respective state’s DeHoGa 
section. For the case of the DeHoGa, a local units’ referral to the federal umbrella 
association’s statement on airbnb does not count as voiced interest. The federal position 
addresses the federal government to address the competitive disadvantages the hotel industry 
has compared to home sharing markets (e.g. different levels of consumer protection). For this 
paper, the hotel industry voiced interest if their local or state’s DeHoGa branch directly 
addressed the municipality and/or mentioned misappropriation decrees as a possibility to 
correct what they perceived as competitive advantage.  
 
Similarly, tenants association voiced interest if they either locally published a press release on 
e.g. Airbnb’s impact on the housing market, or if one of the Google searches produced a 
result in which, for example in a local newspaper article, the DMB called for a regulation of 
the home-sharing market. Figures 6 and 7 depict the distribution of the voiced interests.  
 
                                                        
73 The three searches were: “CITY airbnb Zweckentfremdung”, “CITY airbnb DMB/Mieter” “CITY airbnb 
DeHoGa/Hotelerie” 
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Figure 8: Voiced Interest Tenant's Association 
 
Figure 9: Voiced Interest Hotel Industry 
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4.3. Method of Analysis – Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
The method of analysis for this paper is called Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). 
QCA. Originally developed by Charles Ragin, an U.S. American social scientist, QCA was at 
first only sporadically used by political scientists and sociologists but increasingly found its 
way into other fields of research such as economics, legal studies and health policy research. 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis therefore “counts among the most influential recent 
innovations in social science methodology.”74 
 
QCA can be considered as a hybrid between case-oriented qualitative designs and variable-
oriented quantitative methods. Generally speaking, it combines the depth of a single or small-
n study, deriving a few key characteristics or conditions that are then systematically examined 
on a medium n-analysis.75 This analysis then, based on Boolean Algebra and explained in 
more detail in part 4.3.3., firstly defines an outcome condition as well as causal conditions 
that are either present or absent, and then establishes set-theoretic connections between the 
explanans and the explanandum. The process leads to one or multiple casual pathways to an 
outcome and defines necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the outcome 
condition.76 According to Charles Ragin, qualitative comparative approaches are based on 
two main concepts: equifinality and combinational causation. Equifinality takes into account 
that there may be more than one casual pathway to the same outcome. Causal combination 
means “the effects of individual conditions may depend on the presence or absence of other 
conditions”. 77  According to Claudius Wageman, QCA therefore is a causal method 
appropriate to determine which factors (or combinations thereof) lead to a certain event of 
interest.78 
 
It needs to be specified that QCA should be regarded as a family of research methods 
consisting of crisp set QCA (csQCA), fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA) and multivalue QCA.79 The 
original method, developed by Charles Ragin, is csQCA in which the conditions are 
dichotomously coded, meaning that a condition is either present or absent. It is the method 
                                                        
74 Thiem, Alrik; Dusa, Adrian, (2013) “QCA: A Package for Qualitative Comparative Analysis”, in The 
Research Journal, Vol.5 No.1, pp. 87-97, p. 87 
75 Krook, Mona Lena, (2010), “Woman’s representation in Government: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis”, 
in Political Studies, Vol. 58 No. 2 p.890 
76 Schneider, Casten Q., Claudius Wagemann, (2007),  “Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) und Fuzzy 
Sets”, Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen 
77 Krook (2010), “Woman’s representation in Government: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis”, p.887.  
78 Schneider, Wagemann (2007), “Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) und Fuzzy Sets”, p.20 
79 ibid., p.22 
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used in this paper and introduced more thoroughly below. For the sake of completeness, 
however, it is mentioned that in multivariate QCA, outcome conditions can take more than 
two values.80 In fsQCA, the set membership criteria can vary, meaning that a condition can 
take every value between 0 and 1 (the closer a case is to one, the more is it part of the 
respective set).81 
 
 
4.3.1. The Case for QCA for this research question 
 
Two particular characteristics of qualitative-comparative analysis make this technique a well-
suited method for the research at hand. Similar to a study by Marin Good (et. al.) 
investigating factors impacting the spending of the 26 Swiss canton’s, the number of cases in 
this study (n=22) is very apt for QCA’s ability to compare a medium-n case selection in a 
systematical way. 82  Furthermore, the fact that qualitative comparative analyses identify 
necessary and sufficient conditions and combinations of conditions for the respective 
explanandum is useful if the objective of the study is to test existing theories.83 
 
4.3.2. The function and execution of the Crisp Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
Both function and execution of csQCA approaches can best be explained in a step-by-step 
approach used by e.g. Deborah Cragun et. al. Based on their explanation of a csQCA study, I 
will, in the following, describe the function and execution of csQCA.  
 
Step one – Specifying conditions 
For the case at hand, a test of existing theories on a new phenomenon, the conditions are 
ought to be based in the theoretical literature. The operationalization described in part 4.2. 
addresses this step. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
80 Cragun, Deborah; Pal, Tuya; Vadaparampil, Susan T.; Baldwin, Julie; Hampel, Heather; DeBate, Rita D., 
(2015) “Qualitative Comparative Analysis: A Hybrid Method for Identifying Factors Associated With Program 
Effectiveness”, in Journal of Mixed Methods Research, Vol. 10 No. 3, pp. 251-272, p.252 
81 Schneider, Wagemann (2007), “Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) und Fuzzy Sets”, p. 231 
82 Good, Marin; Hurst, Simon; Willener Rahel; Sager, Fritz, (2012), “Die Ausgaben der Schweizer Kantone - 
Eine Fuzzy Set QCA”, in Swiss Political Science Review, Vol.18 No.4, pp. 452-476 
83 Cragun, Pal, Vadaparampil, Baldwin, Hampel, DeBate (2015) “Qualitative Comparative Analysis: A Hybrid 
Method for Identifying Factors Associated With Program Effectiveness”, p. 252 
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Step two – Gathering data 
The advantage of the QCA approach is that, in general, all kinds of data sources can be used 
(e.g. even interviews).84 The methods, sources and descriptive statistics of the raw data for 
this research project are described in part 4.3.  
 
Step three – Calibrating the crisp set 
The calibration process is often times a point of critique for papers using QCA and is also 
addressed by most scholars applying QCA techniques. In the ideal case, the 0-1 threshold for 
the dichotomous crisp set is defined based on theory, the researchers knowledge of the data, 
and the context of the cases.85 Values below the threshold mean that the particular case is not 
part of that condition set (represented with a ‘0’ in the truth table) whilst values above the 
threshold are and are represented with a ‘1’. The calibration thresholds for this paper are as 
follows:  
 
A city without an active misappropriation decree will not be part of the set ‘REGULATION’ 
and is coded with a ‘0’. A city that put a decree into effect is part of the set and will be 
represented by a ‘1’ in the truth table. 
 
The raw data on rental-market prices is calibrated along the average, meaning that an increase 
of less than 24% between 2009 and 2016 translates into a ‘0’ and an increase of more than 
24% into a ‘1’ in the data set. The 0-1 threshold here is artificial and not based in theory. In 
the absence of theory, it is, however, recommended to code along the average of the data set. 
Nevertheless this circumstance will be addressed in the limitation section. 
 
For the ‘HOTEL_CAPACITY’ condition, an average capacity usage over 50% in 2016 
translates into a 1 (therefore part of the set) and usage under 50% into a 0 (not part of the set). 
The 0-1 threshold is rooted in the fact that some hotel-market reports interpret a capacity 
usage of over 50% as an indicator for a possible, yet somtimes limited, undersupply of hotel 
rooms.86  
 
                                                        
84 Cragun, Pal, Vadaparampil, Baldwin, Hampel, DeBate (2015) “Qualitative Comparative Analysis: A Hybrid 
Method for Identifying Factors Associated With Program Effectiveness”, p.252 
85 Krook (2010), “Woman’s representation in Government: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis” 
86 Colliers International, “Marktbericht Berlin Hotel”, 2017  
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The conditions ‘TENANT_ASSOCIATION’ and ‘DEHOGA’ are coded as a ‘1’ if the 
searches described above produced a result, and as a ‘0’ if they did not.  
 
Step four – Truth Table 
This calibration of the raw data leads to the following truth table.  
CITY REGULATION 
RENTAL 
PRICE_DEVELOPMENT 
HOTEL 
CAPACITY 
TENANT 
ASSOCIATION 
DEHOGA 
Munich 1 1 1 1 1 
Stuttgart 1 1 1 1 0 
Saarbruecken 0 0 0 0 1 
Mainz 0 0 0 0 0 
Wiesbaden 0 0 0 0 1 
Erfurt 0 1 0 0 0 
Dresden 0 0 1 0 1 
Dusseldorf  0 0 0 1 1 
Hannover 0 0 0 0 0 
Magdeburg 0 0 0 0 0 
Potsdam 0 0 1 1 1 
Schwerin  0 0 0 0 1 
Kiel 0 0 0 0 1 
Hamburg 1 0 1 1 1 
Berlin 1 1 1 1 1 
Bremen 0 1 0 0 1 
Frankfurt a.M.  0 1 1 0 1 
Dortmund 1 1 0 1 1 
Essen  0 0 0 1 1 
Leipzig 0 1 1 1 1 
Nuremberg 0 1 0 1 1 
Cologne 1 0 1 1 1 
 
Table 1: Truth Table 
 
Step five – Analyzing the Results 
For the last step, the analysis and interpretation of the result (the content of chapters 5 and 6), 
some definitions on the basis of some examples are in place.  
 
First of all, a condition is sufficient for the outcome if it leads to the outcome in each of the 
cases. In other words: there may not be a single case where the outcome is existent but the 
condition is not. The set-theoretic notation is X -> Y (reads as: “if ‘X’ then ‘Y’”). On the 
other hand, a condition is necessary if it is existent whenever the outcome is. In other words: 
there may not be a case in which the outcome exists but the suspected necessary condition is 
not. The set-theoretic notation is Y <- X.87,88 An extensive csQCA approach can include a test 
for necessary and sufficient conditions to see whether a condition alone, rather than in 
                                                        
87 Schneider, Wagemann (2007), “Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) und Fuzzy Sets”, p.32-37 
88 To complete the set theoretic framework, one would need to define a necessary and sufficient condition. As 
we will see below, this would be redundant for the analysis of this research.  
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combination with other conditions, can lead to a given outcome. I will put (and explain) such 
an analysis in front of the pathway analysis. Since in most cases this is not the case, a pathway 
analysis, analyzing which combination of sets leads to a given outcome, is necessary. 
 
Based on the truth table, the researcher runs the first regression. For this paper I used Charles 
Ragin’s program, fsQCA.89 The program then lists all possible causal combinations and the 
number of cases showing these attributes. An example of the dataset described below can be 
seen in Table 2.  
 
 
RENTAL_PRICE_  
DEVELOPMENT 
 
HOTEL_ 
CAPACITY 
 
TENANT_ 
ASSOCIATION 
 
DEHOGA 
 
number 
 
Regulation 
 
cases 
 
raw 
consist. 
 
PRI 
consist. 
 
SYM 
consist 
 
0 1 1 1 3 -  0.666667 0.666667 0.666667 
1 1 1 1 3 -  0.666667 0.666667 0.666667 
1 0 1 1 2 -  0.5 0.5 0.5 
1 1 1 0 1 -  1 1 1 
0 0 0 1 4 -  0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 3 -  0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 2 -  0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 -  0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 -  0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 1 -  0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 1 -  0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0      
1 1 0 0 0      
0 0 1 0 0      
1 0 1 0 0      
0 1 1 0 0      
 
Table 2: Combinations and Cases 
 
Any given dataset produces 2k combinations, wherein k denotes the number of conditions. 
Table 2 stems from the data set of this thesis that includes four conditions. Not surprisingly, 
the number column says that not all possible condition combinations are actually found in the 
data set. Some, on the other hand, appear more often. Raw consistency refers to the share of 
cases per line that are also part of the outcome condition set. In line one of Table 2, three 
cases are part of the set-conditions HOTEL_CAPACITY, TENANT_ASSOCIATION and 
DEHOGA. The column ‘raw consistency” (0.667) means that 2 out of the 3 cases are in the 
set of the outcome condition (REGULATION), whilst the other one is not. A raw consistency 
of 0 indicates that none of the cases has a misappropriation decree in place.90 The researcher 
then deletes the rows without any actual cases (frequency cutoff) 91  and decides on a 
                                                        
89 To be downloaded from: http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/index.shtml  
90 The other two terms are only useful for fsQCA approaches and are therefor left out. 
91 For larger n truth tables cutting of combinations with less than two cases can be considered. My frequency 
cutoff, however, is set at one (as long as a causal combination covers one city it will be part of the 
minimalization process) 
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consistency cutoff. The higher the consistency cutoff, the fewer contradictions the program 
will produce. The user’s guide for Ragin’s fsQCA recommends a frequency cutoff of 0.75 
percent.92 Since this would render the regression futile (only one ‘perfect’ combination in line 
four), I decided on a cutoff at 0.5. Since I compiled the dataset myself I can discuss the 
resulting contradictions. 
 
The last step of the process is then for the program to minimize the existing pathways to those 
set-combinations explaining the existence of regulation (or non-regulation). This Boolean-
minimalization leads to the following (example) output.  
 
 
INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION 
frequency cutoff: 1 
consistency cutoff: 0.5 
Assumptions: 
 
Pathway Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency 
A * B * C  0.6 0.05 0.75 
A * C * D  0.66 0.15 0.6 
B * C * D  0.75 0.40 0.666 
solution coverage: 1 
solution consistency: 0.666667 
Table 3: Example Output 
 
For this output, ‘raw coverage’ means that this pathway explains/covers 60% of the cases that 
are set of the outcome condition. ‘Unique coverage’, on the other hand, illustrates how much 
of all the cases (including the ones that do not show the outcome) this particular set covers. 
The most important column here is ‘consistency’. The consistency score of 0.75 means that 
the pathway offered here does only explain the existence of the outcome condition for 75% of 
the cases.  
 
Resulting from the consistency score, we will identify critical cases: cases that normally 
should, but for a reason not covered by the conditions, do not lead to the outcome of interest. 
The interpretation of a csQCA will then deal with these cases.  
 
To conclude the section on csQCA and in order to align the above outlined research project 
with what the methodology can achieve, the three hypotheses will be reformulated: 
 
                                                        
92 Ragin, Charles C. (2017), “User’s guide to Fuzzy-Set / Qualitative Comparative Analysis”, University of 
California, Irvine. 
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H1: The existence of a market failure is a sufficient condition for cities to issue 
misappropriation decrees. 
 
H2: The existence of voiced private interest is a sufficient condition for cities to issue 
misappropriation decrees. 
 
H3:  Causal pathways to regulation will include conditions on both market failures and 
private interest.  
 
H1 and H2 are set up to test whether public or private interest theories have more predictive 
power of the drivers of regulation in the Sharing Economy. Should H1 and H2 need to be 
rejected and H3 accepted, further research needs to investigate what the interaction between 
interest groups, the home-sharing markets and its external effects, and legislators exactly 
looks like.  
 
 
 
5. Results 
 
This section presents the results following the above described research design. I ran two 
sufficient condition tests (for regulation and non-regulation) as well as two pathway 
regressions (also for regulation and non-regulation). While this part presents the findings, the 
following chapter will interpret the findings and put them in the context of the theoretical 
framework.  
 
5.1. Sufficient and Necessary Conditions for Regulation 
 
Outcome variable: Regulation 
 
Conditions Tested Consistency Coverage 
RENTAL_PRICE_DEVELOPMENT 0.666667 0.444444 
~ RENTAL_PRICE_DEVELOPMENT 0.333333 0.153846 
HOTEL_CAPACITY 0.833333 0.555556 
~ HOTEL_CAPACITY 0.166667 0.076923 
TENANT_ASSOCIATION 1.000000 0.545455 
~ TENANT_ASSOCIATION 0.000000 0.000000 
DEHOGA 0.833333 0.294118 
~ DEHOGA 0.166667 0.200000 
 
Table 4: Sufficient conditions for regulation 
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Table 4 depicts the results for the necessary and sufficiency test for regulation. The ~ before a 
condition means a negated set (e.g. no voiced interest of the DeHoGa or a tenants association 
etc.). Similar to the terminology used above, coverage tests what share of a given set is also a 
subset of the outcome condition (the predictive power of the condition to the outcome). 
Consistency, on the other hand, tests what share of the outcome set is also a subset of the 
respective causal condition (what the outcome variables have in common). Coverage, 
therefore, tests for sufficiency while consistency tests necessity.  
 
We see that the condition capturing the tenant’s associations’ interest shows a consistency 
score of 1, meaning that in all cases that have a regulation in place, the condition is present. 
The outcome condition, however, only covers 54,5% of the tenant’s interest condition. As the 
truth table shows: out of 11 cities where a tenant’s association voiced an interest only six 
decided to regulate, while five did not. TENANT_ASSOCIATION is therefore not a 
sufficient (if x then y) but a necessary condition (whenever y then x) for regulation. The other 
interest-based condition (DEHOGA) is – set theoretically speaking – not a necessary 
condition but is present in 83% of the regulated cities. Due to the low coverage scores, 
however, it does not do well at predicting regulation alone. The high consistency scores for 
the presence (and low consistency scores for absence) of the interest-based conditions, for 
now, seem to be in line with private interest theories’ predictions. The fact that they do not 
show high coverage scores on their own (sufficiency scores) will be discussed in part 6.3.93 
 
The results for the two market-failure conditions are noteworthy as well. A market-failure on 
the rental market is only present in two thirds of the regulation cases (0.66 consistency score), 
and only 44,4% of the cities with an above average rental price development have regulations 
in place. The fact that 55,5% of the cities with a high hotel capacity usage have regulations in 
place (accompanied with a consistency score of 0.83) is contradicting the original 
conceptualization of the condition and will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  
  
 
 
 
                                                        
93 It is, however, too early, to reject H1 right away. It might be possible that a minimalization process produces 
only pathways including RENTAL_PRICE_DEVELOPMENT and is not able to detect pathways/solutions for 
the other two regulation cities (they would then be contradictions). The pathway solution coverage can then (in 
this case) not be higher than 66% (6 cities with regulation but only 4 with above average rental price 
development). In that case, a point for the sufficiency of the rental-market-failure in context can be made.  
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5.2. Sufficient and Necessary Conditions for Non-Regulation 
 
Outcome variable: No Regulation 
 
Conditions Tested Consistency Coverage 
RENTAL_PRICE_DEVELOPMENT 0.312500 0.555556 
~ RENTAL_PRICE_DEVELOPMENT 0.687500 0.846154 
HOTEL_CAPACITY 0.250000 0.444444 
~ HOTEL_CAPACITY 0.750000 0.923077 
TENANT_ASSOCIATION 0.312500 0.454545 
~ TENANT_ASSOCIATION 0.687500 1.000000 
DEHOGA 0.750000 0.705882 
~ DEHOGA 0.250000 0.800000 
 
Table 5: Sufficient conditions for non-regulation 
 
Table 5 shows the corresponding results for the necessary and sufficient conditions to non-
regulation. First of all, the absence of tenant’s voiced interests is a sufficient condition for 
non-regulation. Whenever there is no tenant’s associations’ voiced interest, there is no 
regulation. The high DEHOGA (and ~DEHOGA to be precise) scores can be explained by the 
fact that there are only five out of 22 cities where the DeHoGa did not voice an interest to 
have home-sharing markets regulated. The coverage scores suggest that both the absence and 
the presence of a voiced interest are likely to lead to non-regulation. Looking at the 
consistency, we see that in 75% of the cities that have no regulation, the DeHoGa did voice an 
interest to regulate the market leading to the assumption that the hotel industry’s interest alone 
does not cause regulation. In line with the theoretical background on public interest theories is 
the absence of a rental market failure’s coverage rate of 0.84. Similar to the findings 
described above, we observe the paradox of a high coverage score for the absence of a high 
hotel-capacity likely leading to no regulation (coverage score of 0.92). 
 
Although the consistency and coverage scores are a first indicator for answering the question 
of which conditions drive the regulation of home-sharing markets, this output does not reveal 
anything about the interaction of the conditions. The two tables above, for example, say that 
the presence or absence of one market failure alone does not lead to an outcome but there 
might still be a market-failure in every pathway to regulation. To clearly test the hypotheses, 
conditional pathways need to be set up. The next two subdivisions will introduce the 
pathways to regulation and to non-regulation.  
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5.3 Pathways to Regulation 
 
 
Table 6: Pathways to regulation 
Pathway Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency 
RENTAL_PRICE_DEVELOPMENT * 
HOTEL_CAPACITY * 
TENANT_ASSOCIATION 
 
0.5 0.167 0.75 
RENTAL_PRICE_DEVELOPMENT * 
TENANT_ASSOCIATION * DEHOGA 
 
0.5 0.167 0.6 
HOTEL_CAPACITY * 
TENANT_ASSOCIATION * DEHOGA 
0.667 0.333 0.666 
Solution coverage: 1 
Solution consistency: 0.666667 
 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term  
RENTAL_PRICE_DEVELOPMENT * HOTEL_CAPACITY * TENANT_ASSOCIATION:  
Munich (1,1), Stuttgart (1,1), Berlin (1,1), Leipzig (1,0) 
 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term  
RENTAL_PRICE_DEVELOPMENT * TENANT_ASSOCIATION * DEHOGA:  
Munich (1,1), Berlin (1,1), Dortmund (1,1), Leipzig (1,0), Nuremberg (1,0) 
 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term  
HOTEL_CAPACITY * TENANT_ASSOCIATION * DEHOGA:  
Munich (1,1), Potsdam (1,0), Hamburg (1,1), Berlin (1,1), Leipzig (1,0), Koeln (1,1) 
 
Table 6 depicts the outcome after the minimalization process. With a frequency cutoff of 1, a 
consistency cutoff of 0.5, and assuming that both presence and absence of the causal 
conditions can lead to regulation, we derive three pathways consisting of three conditions 
eachleading to regulation. This solution covers all the regulated cities (solution coverage=1) 
but is only 66% consistent, meaning that the pathways produce a number of contradictions. 
The three sections below the table indicate the cities that follow the respective pathway. The 
first digit in brackets means that the city is part of the pathway; the second indicates whether 
or not the city has a regulation in place (is subset of the outcome condition).  
 
The low unique coverage score for all three pathways results from the small share of cities 
with regulation and should therefore not be overrated. All three pathways explain regulation 
solely through the existence of a condition and, as the necessary conditions test anticipated, 
all of the pathways include the condition of the tenant’s association. In addition to that, the 
first and the third pathway include the condition depicting the hotel capacity usage. The cases 
defined by these pathways are not contradicting but, as mentioned in the section on the 
necessary conditions test, the presence of HOTEL_CAPACITY in regulation pathways is a 
theoretical contradiction. I will go into this theoretical contradiction while interpreting the 
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results in the next chapter. Despite this contradiction, one can already see that pathways to 
regulation always consist of at least one market-failure condition and at least one interest-
based condition. This finding will be discussed in part 6.3. where, after the interpretation of 
the results, the above mentioned hypotheses will be rejected or accepted.  
 
The pathway rental price, hotel-capacity and tenant association covers three of the six 
regulated cities and shows an internal consistency of 75% with three of the four cities 
following this path. The pathway hotel-capacity, tenant association and DeHoGa, on the other 
hand, covers 4 of the six regulated cities but shows less inner consistency since Leipzig and 
Potsdam follow the path but do not regulate their home-sharing market.  
 
The most striking result is that Leipzig is part of every pathway but does not have a 
misappropriation decree in effect. It is therefore the most important contradiction. Other 
contradictions for the regulation pathways are Nuremberg and Potsdam. I will interpret (or 
resolve) these contradictions in the next chapter.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xlv 
5.4 Pathways to Non-Regulation 
 
Table 7: Pathways to non-regulation 
Pathway      Raw coverage Unique coverage   Consistency 
~ HOTEL_CAPACITY 
* ~ TENANT_ASSOCIATION 
 
0.5625 0.25 1 
~ TENANT_ASSOCIATION 
* DEHOGA 
 
0.4375 0.125 1 
~ HOTEL_CAPACITY 
* DEHOGA 
 
0.5 0.1875 0.888889 
Solution coverage: 0.875 
Solution consistency: 0.933333 
 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~ HOTEL_CAPACITY *~ TENANT_ASSOCIATION:  
Saarbruecken (1,1), Mainz (1,1), Wiesbaden (1,1), Erfurt (1,1), Hannover (1,1), Magdeburg (1,1),  
Schwerin (1,1), Kiel (1,1), Bremen (1,1) 
 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~ TENANT_ASSOCIATION * DEHOGA:  
Saarbruecken (1,1), Wiesbaden (1,1), Dresden (1,1), Schwerin (1,1), Kiel (1,1), Bremen (1,1),  
Frankfurt a.M. (1,1) 
 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~ HOTEL_CAPACITY * DEHOGA: 
Saarbruecken (1,1), Wiesbaden (1,1), Duesseldorf (1,1), Schwerin (1,1), Kiel (1,1), Bremen (1,1), 
Dortmund (1,0), Essen (1,1), Nuremberg (1,1) 
 
Table 7 shows the pathways solution for non-regulation assuming that both presence and 
absence of the conditions can lead to non-regulation. A frequency cutoff of 1 and a 
consistency cutoff at 0,5 produces three pathways, each consisting of two conditions. Unlike 
the regulation solution, this solution does not cover all cities with non-regulation (solution 
coverage of 87,5) but therefore produces fewer critical cases (solution consistency of 93,3%). 
The missing 12,5 percentage points of the solution coverage can be explained by the 
contradictions of the regulation solution. Leipzig and Potsdam are covered by the regulation 
but not by the non-regulation solution. Another difference between the solutions is that here 
the absence of a condition is part of all pathways.  
 
The unique coverage is, much like the unique coverage of the regulation pathways, a result of 
the high number of cities not regulating home-sharing markets. Anticipated by the necessary 
and sufficient conditions test above we see that the absence of the tenant’s association’s 
condition leads to non-regulation. The only pathway without the non-set of tenant’s 
association shows a lower consistency.94  Pathways two and three reaffirm the assumption 
that the hotel industry’s interest, especially compared to the tenant’s counterpart, is a weaker 
predictor to regulation. Similar to the regulation pathways, the theoretical contradiction of the 
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hotel market failure is present here as well. The pathway the theoretical framework suggests 
comprises the absence of interest groups, rental-price development and the presence of the 
hotel market failure. Disregarding the sufficient condition of absent tenant association’s 
interest, these pathways do not measure up to the theory’s expectations.  
 
Nevertheless, the solution is very consistent and produces only one contradiction in pathway 
three. Dortmund did not face a market failure in the hotel market but the DeHoGa did voice 
an interest. This contradiction and the form of regulation the municipality of Dortmund 
applied will be discussed below.  
 
 
 
6. Interpretation 
 
Contrary to the theory-based expectation, we neither found any sufficient conditions for 
regulation nor pathways that consist of only market-failure or interest-based conditions. In 
addition to that, both solutions, despite their comparatively high coverage, produced 
contradicting cases (Nuremberg, Potsdam, Leipzig and Dortmund). Furthermore, the 
existence of over capacity-usage of the hotel-market seems to lead to regulation rather than 
de- or non-regulation.  
 
6.1. Critical Cases of Regulation. 
 
The three pathways for regulation comprise both interest and market failure conditions. We 
see that a market failure, especially in the form of an external effect on the rental market, in 
combination with interest group’s activities leads to regulation. On the one hand this suggests 
that both theories have some kind of explanatory power. On the other hand, in the case of 
these 22 German cities, neither market failure nor a private interest can explain the existence 
of regulation alone. In addition to that, the solution for regulation presented in 5.3. produced 
three contradictions. 
 
 
Potsdam and Nuremberg 
Potsdam is part of the pathway of a high hotel-capacity usage and a voiced interest of both the 
tenants association as well as the hotel industry. Despite the interest groups, however, the city 
administration does not see a necessity for regulation since there are only about 300 Airbnb 
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listings for Potsdam. It furthermore stated that even if it wanted to regulate its home-sharing 
market, it could not since the state of Brandenburg did not transfer the misappropriation 
regulation to a local level.95 The case of Potsdam, therefore is not really suitable to criticize 
the theories on the economics of regulation since there is a federal element to the case that the 
theories summarized above do not cover.  
 
Nuremberg, on the other hand, falls under the pathway of a high rental-price, and a voiced 
interest of both interest groups. A misappropriation decree, however, seems not to be in sight 
since, apart form the tenant’s association and the DeHoGa neither the city’s administration 
not local newspapers touched on that subject. Nuremberg is therefore a contradicting case 
since the regulator here would have either maximized the industry’s profits ( = regulating 
Airbnb) or maximized its political support through issuing a misappropriation decree and thus 
increasing its political support by both tenants and the hotel industry.  
 
Leipzig 
Unlike Potsdam and Nuremberg, Leipzig is part of all three pathways to regulation. As can be 
seen in the truth table, it also shows the presence of all conditions despite lacking the outcome 
condition, since Leipzig did not regulate its home-sharing market. The fact that the whole 
regulation-solution defined Leipzig as a contradicting case suggests that there is a condition 
that has an impact on the outcome condition which the data-set did not cover.  
 
This condition, similar to the Potsdam/Brandenburg case, is the federal element. Although 
local politicians were willing to regulate its home-sharing markets due to the tense rental-
market, lawmakers on the federal level did not empower the municipalities of Saxony to issue 
misappropriation decrees. The Saxon government’s answer to an enquiry from a 
parliamentarian of the Saxonian state parliament stated that it does not see the necessity for 
such a law, given that the effect of misappropriation of living space (partly due to home-
sharing markets) on the rental-market is only visible in the two largest cities (Dresden and 
Leipzig). Since rental-markets in other parts of the state were characterized by vacancy, the 
Saxon government would not consider passing a corresponding law96. In addition to that, state 
parliamentarians from conservative, liberal and green parties referred to the Sharing Economy 
                                                        
95 Märkische Allgemeine, “Hoteliers fürchten Airbnb-Boom in Potsdam”, 15.5.2017 
96 Sächsisches Staatsministerium des Inneren, “Kleine Anfrage des Abgeordneten Wolfram Günther. Thema: 
zunehmender Wohnungsmangel durch Zweckentfremdung in den sächsischen Ballungsräumen Dresden und 
Leipzig”, Sächsischer Landtag, 13.7.2017. 
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as a chance for Saxony to foster its tourism. With regards to the hotel industry, 
parliamentarians advised interest groups like the DeHoGa to accept Airbnb as a competitor 
and find ways to make the incumbent industry more attractive than home-sharing platforms.  
 
A similar state-level weighing between cities and rural areas can be seen in Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern where the cities Rostock and Schwerin face a, compared to the state (!), tense 
rental market while rural areas, especially at the Baltic Sea, profit from home-sharing through 
increased tourism.97 Politicians from Mainz and Dresden, although they are covered by non-
regulation pathways and do not have a regulation in place, were thinking of regulating home-
sharing markets but pointed out the missing state-level legislation. 
 
This federal element, with different lawmakers with distinct policy-goals and constituencies 
impeding (necessary) regulation at a local government is very much in line with Benjamin 
Barber’s point of cities being efficient at regulating in the people’s interest. The fact that the 
data set did not account for a federal element will be addressed in the limitations section.  
 
 
6.2. Critical Cases of Non-Regulation 
 
The results of both the necessary conditions test and the pathway-minimalization show that 
the expectations of a hotel market failure and the absence of a tense rental market leading to 
no regulation are not met. The interest and market-failure mixed pathways do also not fulfill 
the expectation that the absence of voiced private interests leads to an unregulated home-
sharing market. Despite that, the solution, disregarding the contradictions of the regulation 
solution, covers all non-regulated cities with Dortmund as the only contradiction. 
 
Dortmund: 
The city of Dortmund falls under the pathway of no over capacity utilization of the hotel 
market and a voiced interest of the DeHoGa. In this pathway, public and private interest 
theory would predict different outcomes. The absence of a market failure makes regulation 
less likely for public and more likely for private interest theory given the voiced interest of the 
hotel industry (and, as can be seen in the truth table, the tenant’s association). Out of the nine 
cities falling under the pathway, Dortmund is the only city measuring up to the private interest 
theory’s expectation since it decided to regulate its home-sharing market.   
                                                        
97 Schleswigsche Volkszeitung, “Mietwohnungen zu Ferienwohnungen”, 20.7.2015 
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However, the issuing of the misappropriation decree was met by Airbnb’s approval. The 
reason for that is that unlike in Berlin, Hamburg or Munich, Airbnb agreed with the city of 
Dortmund to pay the bed-tax for every night spent in an Airbnb in Dortmund.98 Airbnb, in 
turn, charges the renter subletting through Airbnb the same amount as a service fee. It is 
noticeable that Dortmund’s definition of misappropriation does ban the commercial short-
term subletting of living space but does not define how many days, nights or weeks per year 
are defined as commercial therefore creating some sort of grey area. Whether or not this offer 
from Airbnb or the consequential agreement had an influence on the form or rigidity of the 
regulation is hard to say. But the fact that Airbnb spokespersons mention that negotiations for 
similar agreements with other German cities take place suggests that this kind of cooperation 
might lead to outcomes favorable to Airbnb. Interestingly, this approach to regulatory 
cooperation could be what Rauch and Schleicher were referring to with their call for new 
approaches to regulation from incumbent and challenging industries on the one hand, and 
legislators and regulators on the other hand.  
 
Furthermore, Dortmund is a good example for the political support-maximizing politician. On 
the one hand, the legislators in Dortmund gained the support of the hotel industry as well as 
the tenant’s association. On the other, they were able to agree on a deal with Airbnb creating 
tax revenue they would have missed in an unregulated home-sharing market. The hotel 
industry’s complaints about other competitive disadvantages such as differing social 
regulations (e.g. consumer protection) do not address the city of Dortmund since these 
regulations are set at a state or federal level.  
 
 
6.3. The ambiguity of the hotel capacity condition 
  
The pathway making Dortmund a contradiction sheds a new light on the market-failure based 
hotel capacity condition. The theoretical assumption was that a high capacity utilization is a 
proxy for no competition in the local hotel market and, hence, a potential market failure. To 
correct this market failure, legislators might intervene which, in this case would mean not 
regulating the home sharing market (thereby offering more beds and potentially increased 
price competition). A low capacity utilization, on the other hand, purports more competition 
in the market with lower prices. Advocating the public interest, regulators will not have to 
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intervene. But industrie’s operating in competitive markets are, according to private interest 
theories, likely be regulated since Peltzman’s formulation expects the incumbent industry to 
acquire favorable economic regulation (e.g. in the form of market entry barriers which a 
misappropriation decree would undoubtedly be).  
 
Although intended as a market-failure condition, HOTEL_CAPACITY therefore implicitly is 
also a condition testing interest-based theories. This ambiguity will be considered in the 
following part that tests the hypotheses and links the findings to the theoretical framework.  
 
 
6.4. Linking the findings to theory. 
 
Having interpreted the results and discussed the contradicting cases, this section will accept or 
reject the afore-mentioned hypotheses.  
 
The first hypothesis this paper tested reads as: 
 
H1:   The existence of a market failure is a sufficient condition for cities to issue 
misappropriation decrees.  
 
Since I did not find that market-failures are sufficient conditions to regulation, I will reject H1.  
In addition to the ambiguous hotel market-failure condition we see that most cities with 
regulations in place are a subset of the rental market-failure condition. While this might be the 
case because of the 0-1 threshold setting, a limitation that will be addressed below, we 
observe several cities with a tense rental market not regulating their home-sharing markets. 
The pathways to regulation are not solely consisting of market-failure conditions and, in two 
of three cases, include the hotel capacity condition that, according to the theory, should lead 
to an unregulated home-sharing market.  
 
Since H1 was put up to test public interest theories, it needs to be noted that the absence of a 
hotel market failure shows a very high coverage score and appears in two of the three 
pathways to no regulation. We can therefore conclude that the presence of a market failure 
(either on the rental or the hotel market) alone does not explain a market failure but the 
absence of a hotel market-failure is a good indicator for non-regulation.  
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H2:  The existence of a voiced private interest is a sufficient condition for cities to issue 
misappropriation decrees. 
 
Similar to the findings for H1, I did not find that private interests are a sufficient condition and 
therefore reject H2. The necessary condition test showed that a voiced interest by the tenant’s 
association is a necessary condition for the presence of a regulation and the absence of such 
an interest a sufficient condition for no regulation. The hotel industry’s interest, although 
present in all regulation cases except Stuttgart, is part of two pathways to non-regulation and 
covers 80% of the non-regulation cases.  
 
Although the hypothesis has to be rejected, we see that the tenant’s association has more 
influence (or predictive power on regulation) than its counterpart of the hotel industry. 
Assuming a political support-maximizing legislator, this makes sense from a theoretical 
viewpoint. The constituency of a local politician most likely consists of more tenants than 
employees of the hotel industry. Legislation in this case is therefore supposed to first and 
foremost ease the tension on the rental market and not to maximize the hotel industry’s 
profits. Moreover, the DeHoGa’s primary concerns are based on disparities in matters of 
consumer protection and address lawmakers on state and federal level. The local level is 
almost always addressed but with a varying degrees of insistence.  
 
Even though we found some evidence that private interests can drive regulation, we have to 
reject the hypothesis as it is formulated above. In line with the criticism of private interest 
theories the questions of how a given interest finds its way into regulation or which interest 
group is more influential under which circumstances are yet to be answered for the case of 
home-sharing markets.  
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H3:  Causal pathways to regulation will include conditions on both market failures and 
private interest.  
 
Since I only found causal pathways to regulation containing both interest and market-failure 
based conditions H3 is accepted. Both theories can, in parts, explain the existence and absence 
of regulation. The answer to the research question (What are the driving factors behind 
regulation in the Sharing Economy?) therefore is “Given that the respective state allows cities 
to regulate the misappropriation of housing spaces: market failures in the rental and hotel 
market as well as interests of the tenant’s association and hotel industry”.  
 
This answer sounds somewhat trivial or mundane but it points out that there is room for future 
research. The interaction of the interest groups under varying rental or hotel market tenseness 
needs to be further investigated. We know that they have an impact on the regulators decision 
but the process of this influence is yet unclear. With regards to public interest theories, further 
research might need to find out whether misappropriation decrees are a remedy to a tense 
housing market or whether platforms like Airbnb have a significant effect of rental prices in 
the first place.  
 
This paper was not designed to identify these processes, but rather the factors driving the 
regulation. Some limitations of this study, however, impeded this research from implicitly 
finding out more about these processes and the effectiveness of the regulations in place. I will 
address these limitations in the next chapter.  
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7. Limitations 
 
The paper at hand produced results that can be the basis for future research. Nevertheless, the 
research design shows some limitations that constrained this paper from further and more 
valid findings. In the following, I will outline four of the limitations.  
 
First of all, the lacking external validity of this study can be increased if the study is widened 
to more cities of different countries. A first step could be to include cities matching the size 
and characteristics (e.g. importance for the regional economy) of the cities in the dataset. This 
comes along with a dataset across different law families (e.g. French, German, common law, 
etc.) and varying degrees of welfare states. Including cities of countries with varying degrees 
of social welfare provided by the state could help answering how social values held in a given 
society can find their way into the legislative discussion-making process and, thus, influence 
regulation.  
 
Furthermore, the lack of data and the resulting diffuse proxy variables as well as an 
operationalization that was in parts ad hoc are limitations future research needs to try to avoid. 
The ambiguity of the hotel capacity stems from the lack of data of the Herfindahl-Hirschmann 
index. Assuming that a mono- or oligopolistic market shows higher prices than one of perfect 
competition, a condition depicting the average price per night (for example using webscraping 
methods on booking sites like booking.com) could have been a remedy to this limitation. 
Then again it is difficult to make these results comparable since hotel markets will vary in 
their number of five-star hotels that are typically more expensive. Operationalizing the 
market-failure on the hotel market without a Herfindahl-Hirschmann index therefore remains 
problematic.  
In addition, the operationalization of the interest groups in the case at hand is 
somewhat solid but does not account for all details in the corresponding theory literature. The 
Chicago theory of regulation postulates that the size and homogeneity of interest groups 
impacts the groups’ success in acquiring favorable regulation. The two conditions depicting 
the interest groups do not account for that. The DeHoGa, for example, is the interest group for 
both the hotel and the gastronomy industry. Since membership is not mandatory, the size as 
well as the actual homogeneity of policy preferences, especially on a local level, is not 
accounted for. Furthermore, there are more interest groups that are affected by home-sharing 
markets and, consequently, have an interest in regulation. One can think of trade unions of the 
hotel industry or the evolving network of home sharers. Including more interest groups and 
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advancing the operationalization so that group size and homogeneity are included can help 
answer the question which interest group is more successful in impacting regulation, 
especially if a similar study is expanded to cities of more than one country. 
 
Thirdly, this study did not include possible intervening variables. I did not control for the 
prevalence of Airbnb in the cities of the dataset. That might, however, be an intervening 
variable – if the regulator knows from the onset that regulating a home sharing market will 
only “regain” a small number of flats a misappropriation decree is likely not to be on the 
political agenda. A condition on the prevalence of Airbnb listings per city can also illustrate 
how many of the listings are posted by professional lessors (e.g. if a flat is rented out more 
than a certain number of times per year) or the ‘typical’ home sharer renting out his flat while 
she or he is on holiday. A home-sharing market with close to no professional lessors will 
therefore, if regulated by a misappropriation decree, not ease the situation on the rental 
market. Consequently, further studies could use webscraping methods over a longer period of 
time to gather this information and transform it into a condition able to be included in the 
dataset.  
 
A crisp set QCA analysis proved to be a suitable means for the approach of this study since it 
produced results stating the necessary and sufficient conditions as well as multiple causal 
pathways to the condition of interest, the regulation of home-sharing markets. However, 
especially if future research is conducted without the limitations I just outlined, a fuzzy set 
QCA analysis might be the better QCA approach. Including either more quantitative raw data 
calibrated into a fuzzy set or, for qualitative raw data, adding more grey to the otherwise 
black-and-white-type dichotomous crisp set, will increase the explanatory power of the 
respective variables.  
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8. Conclusion 
 
The emergence of the Sharing Economy is likely to have vast impacts on the global as well 
national and local economies. The shared use of assets can lead to decreasing production of 
goods and impact whole industries, value chains and millions of jobs. Prices on sharing-
platforms that are cheaper than those of the incumbent competitors can push these incumbent 
industries out of business and create increasing self-employment in sharing-markets. Self-
employment in sharing markets where income depends on demand and supply and not on 
contracts of employment, however, poses the question of the future of our understanding of 
labor, labor rights and the social welfare state. And while at least parts of the Sharing 
Economy can lead to a more sustainable type of economic activity, governments will have to 
find a way to ensure consumer protection and – in the absence of corporations at the center of 
economic activity – a way to tax these markets as they will remain dependent on taxes.  
 
Facing the relevance of the Sharing Economy and its impacts, academia needs to find answers 
on how to deal with this crowd-based capitalism and how governments can harness its virtues 
and mitigate its negative effects. The first puzzle is how governments can regulate markets 
that are not characterized by producers and consumers but by multiple peer-to-peer networks.  
 
This paper’s aim was to investigate whether conventional theories on the economics of 
regulation, founded in the 1970s and 80s, still work in this setting. On the one hand, the paper 
focused on 22 German cities resulting in a lower external validity. On the other, it kept many 
other intervening variables constant leading to a higher internal validity. In trying to answer 
the question on what the drivers behind regulation in the Sharing Economy are, this paper 
produced three main-findings.  
 Although sharing markets are remedy to market-failures (missing markets) they can 
create externalities (other market failures). The paper does not find out whether home-sharing 
markets cause the surge in rental prices, but cities with a particularly large increase of average 
rental costs tend to regulate their home-sharing markets. This does not prove public interest 
theories to be correct, but suggests that they still have some predictive power for the 
regulation in these new markets. 
 Private interests, much like the theory suggests, also seems to have an impact on 
regulation. The presence of a tenant’s associations voiced interest is a necessary condition for 
regulation; its absence a sufficient condition for non-regulation. The interest of the hotel 
industry does not seem to have as much impact on the decision-making process of the 
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regulator. This could be due to the political support maximizing local legislators or because 
the hotel industry typically addresses state or national lawmakers regarding the competitive 
disadvantages deriving from the absence of regulation on taxation on consumer protection. In 
this paper, private interests do not explain and predict regulation alone but they proved to be a 
good proxy.  
 Thirdly, this paper found that public and private interests together seem to be the 
driver behind regulations in German home-sharing markets. The pathways the csQCA 
approach produced all consisted of both market failure and private interest conditions. A 
further look into the contradicting cases showed that in some cases (Leipzig and Dresden) a 
missing state law was impeding the cities to issue misappropriation decrees. The case of 
Dortmund, on the other hand, might be a glimpse into the future of regulatory cooperation 
between governments and sharing-platforms.  
 
With these findings and considering the limitations of this paper, there is plenty of room for 
further research. An economic approach could be to research whether or not the regulations 
put in place by the six German cities are economically efficient, meaning that they actually 
alleviate tense rental markets. A cross-country/city approach can increase the external validity 
of this paper and see whether the findings general hold up or if Germany is a ‘special’ case. 
Another path is to investigate how interest groups influence regulators in more than just one 
national setting and which interest group is most successful in acquiring regulation. Thinking 
of home-sharer communities in various cities, it has to be mentioned that the increasing 
number of peer-to-peer networks at the center of sharing markets impacts the number and 
policy preferences of interest groups. Last but not least, research on how societal or 
community values are transferred into the new regulation is necessary. The question of what 
role politicians, political ideologies or voting systems play in this regulatory process is yet to 
be answered. This question is especially important when the level of analysis is on a state 
level, for example on social regulation or taxation procedures. 
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Annex 
 
Stadt 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
München 51,2 55,2 55,1 57,4 59 59,9 59,4 56,3 
Stuttgart 40,7 43,5 45,6 47,1 47,5 51,2 52,3 54,3 
Saarbrücken 33 35,3 36,3 37,2 39,3 40 41,1 42,6 
Mainz 40,8 41,3 41,5 45,1 45,8 46,3 46 45,4 
Wiesbaden 41,8 42 42,1 40,4 43,8 43,5 44 44,3 
Erfurt 39 39,2 41,5 42,9 43 43,5 44,6 45,2 
Dresden 49,4 51,1 52,3 50,9 51,2 53,3 52,5 52,5 
Düsseldorf  40 43,1 44,3 42,5 47,6 48,6 47,1 48,5 
Hannover 37 39,7 42,2 42,1 42,8 42,9 45,5 46,3 
Magdeburg 32,5 30 29,5 28,9 29,1 30 31,7 33,8 
Potsdam 44 47,8 51,2 52,3 52,5 51,5 53,2 54 
Schwerin  42,3 32,4 31,4 32,8 33,1 32,8 34,7 35,8 
Kiel 39 39,2 39,7 38,8 39,1 39,9 41,7 42 
Hamburg 54,1 54,2 55,2 56,2 59,6 59,7 59,9 56,9 
Berlin 49,9 50,1 50,2 54,5 56,4 58,3 59,3 59,7 
Bremen 41,9 42,5 42,6 42,83 43,4 44 45,2 45,52 
Frankfurt a.M.  42,8 45,1 44,3 48,4 49,8 50,2 52,4 51 
Dortmund 37,3 40,9 42,5 40 41,4 42,9 44,7 46,6 
Essen  41,8 48,3 42,7 42,3 42,6 42,3 42,7 44,5 
Leipzig 44,5 47,5 48,2 49,7 52,3 53,2 53,2 53,6 
Nuremberg 38,5 41,9 43 45,7 45,7 47,5 47,3 48,9 
Köln 44,1 46,4 46,9 48,3 48,4 48,7 50,3 49,4 
Annex 1. Hotel market development 
 
City 
Regulation 
(0=No; 1=Yes) 
Rental Price 
Development 
'09-'16 
ø Hotel capacity 
'12-'16 
tennants' 
association       
(0=No; 1=Yes) 
DeHoGa 
(0=No; 1=Yes) 
München 1 32,60% 56,69% 1 1 
Stuttgart 1 28,70% 47,78% 1 0 
Saarbrücken 0 16% 37,60% 0 1 
Mainz 0 20% 43,77% 0 0 
Wiesbaden 0 21,70% 42,17% 0 1 
Erfurt 0 26% 42,37% 0 0 
Dresden 0 24% 51,65% 0 1 
Düsseldorf  0 21,20% 45,21% 1 1 
Hannover 0 22% 42,31% 0 0 
Magdeburg 0 12,20% 31,73% 0 0 
Potsdam 0 20% 50,10% 1 1 
Schwerin  0 12% 36,97% 0 1 
Kiel 0 18% 38,45% 0 1 
Hamburg 1 22,40% 56,98% 1 1 
Berlin 1 55% 54,80% 1 1 
Bremen 0 30% 43,42% 0 1 
Frankfurt a.M.  0 27% 48% 0 1 
Dortmund 1 27% 42,04% 1 1 
Essen  0 11% 43,40% 1 1 
Leipzig 0 26% 50,28% 1 1 
Nuremberg 0 35,60% 44,81% 1 1 
Köln 1 23% 47,81% 1 1 
Annex 2. Raw data 
 
 
 
 
